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LAW IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA
Rhett B. Larson*
ABSTRACT
Thousands die each day from infections related to water, as evidenced in the ongoing crises
of cholera in Haiti, Zika in the Western Hemisphere, and Legionnaires’ Disease in Flint, Michigan. Yet water law focuses primarily on two agendas. First, the “Blue Agenda” aims to provide
an equitable allocation of water to individuals and communities while encouraging sustainable
water management. Second, the “Green Agenda” aims to efficiently protect water in the natural
environment from pollution. These two agendas often ignore, and can be inconsistent with, the
“Red Agenda.” The Red Agenda addresses prevention of waterborne infections, like cholera, and
the habitat of water-related disease vectors, like mosquitoes transmitting malaria. Additionally,
the Red Agenda focuses on access to water for sanitation and hygiene, with implications for
epidemics like Ebola. In simplified terms, the Blue Agenda is about water quantity, the Green
Agenda about water quality, and the Red Agenda about water diseases. Laws made in pursuit
of the Blue Agenda, like building a dam or irrigation system, can interfere with the Red Agenda
by bringing mosquito habitat closer to human communities. And laws made in the pursuit of the
Green Agenda, like prohibiting discharges of pesticides into a river, can interfere with the Red
Agenda by preventing a response to a malaria outbreak. This Article is the first to introduce the
Blue, Green, and Red framework for water law, and explains why these agendas often conflict
with each other and how to more effectively integrate these agendas into water law.
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long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
In an epic example of insight and courage, John Snow saved countless
lives and forged a heroic legacy.1 His triumph in the face of crisis represented a turning point in history, tipping the balance in the ongoing battle
between mankind and one of mankind’s greatest threats.2 In 1848, one of a
series of massive outbreaks of cholera in the nineteenth century swept
through London.3 Snow observed that the patterns of the outbreak were not
consistent with the then-prominent miasma theory of disease transmission—
the theory that “bad air” was the cause of epidemics like cholera and bubonic
plague.4 Snow theorized that the mode of transmission was water, and distributed a pamphlet advising hand-washing and boiling drinking water.5
In 1854, another cholera epidemic struck London.6 Snow observed that
competing distribution companies delivered water within the Soho neighborhood of London.7 One of these companies, Vauxhall, derived its water supply downstream of major sewer discharges into the Thames River.8 The
other obtained its water supply upstream of the sewer discharges.9 Snow, in
what is called the “Grand Experiment,” compared data on households consuming water supplied from these two companies.10 Snow noted that the
cholera rate was 8.5 times higher in households supplied by Vauxhall than its
competitor.11 He further noted that nearly a quarter of all cholera deaths in
London occurred within a short distance of a hand pump on Broad Street,
which was installed on top of a cesspit.12 After speaking with families near
the pump, most had lost multiple members of their households to cholera,
and all had taken water from the pump.13 Legend has it that Snow removed
1 No, not that Jon Snow. GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES (1996). This
John Snow. PETER VINTEN-JOHANSEN ET AL., CHOLERA, CHLOROFORM, AND THE SCIENCE OF
MEDICINE: A LIFE OF JOHN SNOW (2003).
2 See generally Rita R. Colwell, Global Climate and Infectious Disease: The Cholera Paradigm,
274 SCIENCE 2025, 2026 (1996) (discussing the impact of John Snow’s work on subsequent
scientific endeavors, including modelling of global climate change).
3 JOHN SNOW, ON THE MODE OF COMMUNICATION OF CHOLERA 3–5 (London, John
Churchill 2d ed.1855).
4 Id.; see also Mervyn Susser & Ezra Susser, Choosing a Future for Epidemiology: I. Eras and
Paradigms, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 668, 669 (1996).
5 SNOW, supra note 3, at 118; see also Nigel Paneth, Assessing the Contributions of John
Snow to Epidemiology: 150 Years After Removal of the Broad Street Pump Handle, 15 EPIDEMIOLOGY
514, 515–16 (2004).
6 SNOW, supra note 3, at 76; see also SANDRA HEMPEL, THE STRANGE CASE OF THE BROAD
STREET PUMP: JOHN SNOW AND THE MYSTERY OF CHOLERA 163 (2007).
7 SNOW, supra note 3, at 64.
8 Id.; see also Lewis C. Vollmar, Jr., The Effect of Epidemics on the Development of English
Law from the Black Death Through the Industrial Revolution, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 385, 416–17
(1994).
9 SNOW, supra note 3, at 64.
10 Id. at 75–77; see also HEMPEL, supra note 6, at 174.
11 See HEMPEL, supra note 6, at 174.
12 Id. at 182.
13 Id. at 178–85.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL306.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 3

law in the time of cholera

21-MAR-17

12:19

1273

the handle from the Broad Street pump, and saved the city.14 In one of
history’s greatest examples of inductive reasoning and scientific acumen,
Snow ushered in the germ theory of disease transmission and became the
father of modern epidemiology.15
John Snow’s work also began the integration of epidemiology with the
development and implementation of law.16 In March of 1855, Snow testified
before Parliament regarding the development of laws to address sanitation.17
At the time, a bill was proposed to regulate “offensive trades,” including bone
boiling and gas works, which many believed contributed to the miasma of
bad air and thus to disease transmission.18 Merchants within those trades
called on Snow to testify as an expert witness.19 Snow argued in favor of
increased investment in public sanitation projects and protection of drinking
water sources rather than regulation of offensive trades that impacted air
quality.20 In 1866, after opposition from political and professional opponents and following another devastating outbreak of cholera, Snow’s proposals were finally enacted into law, resulting in regulation of sewage discharges
and treatment requirements for drinking water.21
Greater integration of epidemiology and water law is still required,
including in ex ante procedural rules for the prevention of epidemics, and
improved ex post rules to ensure adequate care for infected persons and
containment of outbreaks.22 In Haiti, for example, an ongoing cholera epidemic has killed over 8500 people and sickened over 600,000.23 In the wake
of the catastrophic earthquake of 2010, UN relief workers from Nepal
14 Id. A handle-less water pump remains on Broadwick Street in Soho as a memorial
to John Snow. Kari S. McLeod, Our Sense of Snow: The Myth of John Snow in Medical Geography, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 923, 932 (2000).
15 See generally Stephanie J. Snow, John Snow: The Making of a Hero?, 372 LANCET 22
(2008).
16 Charles D. Larson, Historical Development of the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, in SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT: AMENDMENTS, REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 3, 4–5
(Edward J. Calabrese et al. eds., 1990).
17 VINTEN-JOHANSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 10; see also James G. Derouin & David R. Nelson, Developments in Toxic Tort
Liability for the Quality of Groundwater Served, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 471 (2007).
21 VINTEN-JOHANSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10; see also STEPHANIE TRUE PETERS, CHOLERA: CURSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (EPIDEMIC!) 46–50 (2005).
22 See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, When Is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1231 (2015) (discussing the role of epidemiology in evaluating the potential
for criminal prosecution of persons intentionally spreading HIV); John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 1063 (1989) (noting the role of epidemiology in allocating liability for mass tort class
action cases).
23 Enrico Bertuzzo et al., On the Probability of Extinction of the Haiti Cholera Epidemic, 30
STOCHASTIC ENVTL. RES. & RISK ASSESSMENT 2043, 2043 (2016).
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brought a particularly virulent form of cholera into Haiti.24 The disease was
introduced into the Haitian population by poor waste management at the
UN camp.25 A U.S. district court judge recently dismissed a lawsuit against
the UN, stating that the UN is immune from liability associated with the cholera outbreak in Haiti.26 The UN came to restore and improve Haiti’s water
infrastructure and protect its water resources, and such immunity arguably
facilitates the UN’s efforts.27 But because of a failure to integrate epidemiology into water planning, the UN introduced a fatal outbreak to an already
reeling nation, an outbreak that has potentially shifted from an epidemic to
an endemic crisis.28
The recent cholera outbreak in Haiti illustrates only one way in which
law can fail to integrate epidemiology.29 Water is both a major avenue
through which pathogens infect people, either directly by ingestion or indirectly by vectors like mosquitoes, and a major factor in the prevention and
treatment of infectious diseases, including through improved hygiene and
sanitation.30 Currently, 2.3 billion people live without access to adequate
clean water supplies and approximately 6000 children under the age of five
die every day from waterborne diseases.31 Officials throughout the Western
Hemisphere are currently struggling to contain the growing Zika virus outbreak, spreading by mosquitoes and resulting in serious birth defects and
death.32 The deadly and ongoing water crisis in Flint, Michigan, has
24 Guy R. Knudsen, Cholera in Haiti: A Perfect Storm of Scientific and Legal Uncertainty, 29
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 14, 15–16 (2014).
25 Id.; see generally ALEJANDRO CRAVIOTO ET AL., FINAL REP. OF THE INDEP. PANEL OF
EXPERTS ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI (2011), http://www.un.org/News/dh/
infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf.
26 Patricia Hurtado, UN Claims Immunity from Haiti Post-Quake Cholera Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-23/un-claimsimmunity-from-haiti-cholera-lawsuit.
27 Id.; see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, United States Defends United
Nations’ Immunity in Haitian Cholera Case, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2014).
28 R.R. Frerichs et al., Nepalese Origin of Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, 18 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION E158 (2012). An infection is “endemic” when it has no need for external input to remain active in a given community.
29 See generally Brian Concannon Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting: A Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1145 (2011)
(discussing greater integration of human health considerations in the law of disaster
response, including improved water access).
30 Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious Disease
Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 64, 70 (1999). In epidemiology, a vector is
any agent (including animal or microorganism) that carries and transmits an infectious
pathogen (for example, a mosquito that transmits malaria).
31 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 537,
538 (2007). “Water stress” occurs where inadequate water quantity or quality prevents
water supply from meeting demand during a period of time. See Water Stress Versus Water
Scarcity, UN DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.html
(last updated Nov. 24, 2014).
32 Reed Johnson et al., Spreading Virus Adds to Brazil’s Woes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/spreading-virus-adds-to-brazils-woes-1450830661; see also

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL306.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 5

law in the time of cholera

21-MAR-17

12:19

1275

included a spike in Legionnaires’ Disease.33 The serious threat to human
health posed by such diseases is likely to be aggravated by global climate
change.34 As such, water law should have a heightened emphasis on the prevention and mitigation of disease epidemics.
Nevertheless, water law largely concentrates on two agendas that are not
directly related to disease prevention or mitigation—what I call the “Blue
Agenda” and the “Green Agenda.” The Blue Agenda is concerned with water
quantity and drought resiliency.35 In particular, the Blue Agenda deals with
the allocation of water rights, the development of water delivery infrastructure, the sustainable management of water consumption, and the apportionment of water resources between people and jurisdictions.36 The Green
Agenda is concerned with water quality.37 In particular, the Green Agenda
deals with the prevention of water pollution, the protection of aquatic ecosystems, and the effective treatment of toxic or carcinogenic chemicals in drinking water.38 While both of these agendas have important implications for
human health, they may at times be pursued in ways that interfere with the
prevention of epidemics or that aggravate disease outbreaks.39
For example, the Green Agenda may prioritize pollution prevention in a
way that interferes with the expeditious application of pesticides to kill mosquito larvae to mitigate a malaria or West Nile virus outbreak.40 The Blue
Agenda may prioritize bringing a reservoir or irrigation infrastructure into a
community, but in doing so, may also bring mosquito habitat closer to that
Shasta Darlington, Brazil Warns Against Pregnancy Due to Spreading Virus, CNN (Dec. 24,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/23/health/brazil-zika-pregnancy-warning/.
33 Matt Ford, A Legionnaires’ Disease Outbreak in Flint, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2016), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/flint-michigan-water-crisis/424062/.
34 See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary
Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445 (2008) (discussing the human health implications of climate
change); see also Erik B. Bluemel, Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive
Entropy in the Regulation of the Global Public Good, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1981, 1990 n.27 (2007).
35 See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Drought Proofing Water Law, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 92
(2003).
36 Rhett B. Larson, Interstitial Federalism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 908 (2015) [hereinafter Larson, Interstitial Federalism]; Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2181 (2013) [hereinafter Larson, The New Right in Water].
37 See, e.g., Anthony DeLaPaz, Note, Leed Locally: How Local Governments Can Effectively
Mandate Green Building Standards, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1212–13.
38 Rhett B. Larson, Orphaned Pollution, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991 (2013).
39 See, e.g., Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding
that pesticide applications require a Clean Water Act permit, which has implications for
dispersal of pesticides to address insect-carried diseases); Larson, The New Right in Water,
supra note 36, at 2234 (noting that regulation of disinfectant byproduct concentrations
may discourage effective pathogen treatment in drinking water).
40 See, e.g., John H. Minan & Tracy M. Frech, Pesticides as “Pollutants” Under the Clean
Water Act, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 109, 135–37 (2010) (discussing the regulation of pesticide
applications in ways that delay response to water-related disease outbreaks).
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community.41 In such instances, the Green and Blue Agenda conflict with
the aim to prevent and mitigate disease outbreaks, what I call the “Red
Agenda.” The Red Agenda deals with the control of habitats of disease vectors, like mosquitoes and snails, and the effective treatment of drinking water
to address waterborne pathogens, like cholera or typhoid.42 Additionally,
the Red Agenda concentrates on the development of sanitation infrastructure to prevent diseases related to fecal contamination, like Cryptosporidium
and E. coli, and improved access to water to prevent hygiene-related
epidemics, like Ebola.43 The three agendas overlap and are mutually reinforcing in important ways. However, water law practitioners and scholars,
and water policymakers, tend to be focused on Green and Blue. The tricolored framework seeks to make water law and policy more holistic and integrated by bringing more attention to the Red Agenda.
FIGURE 1: THE TRI-COLORED AGENDA FRAMEWORK

RED: resiliency to
water diseases

BLUE: equitable
access to water

GREEN: efficient
protection of water
quality

This Article is the first to introduce this tri-colored agenda framework of
water law and policy, and argues for improved integration of the Red Agenda
into water law in ways that are consistent with the Blue and Green Agendas.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the Blue and Green
41 Erin K. MacDonald, Comment, Playing by the Rules: The World Bank’s Failure to Adhere
to Policy in the Funding of Large-Scale Hydropower Projects, 31 ENVTL. L. 1011, 1018 (2001).
42 For a brief overview of treatment and detection methods for waterborne pathogens,
see Timothy M. Straub & Darrell P. Chandler, Towards a Unified System for Detecting Waterborne Pathogens, 53 J. MICROBIOLOGICAL METHODS 185 (2003). For an overview of the role
of water supply development in impacting disease vector habitats, see David J. Bradley,
Water Supplies: The Consequences of Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HEALTH 81 (G.E.W. Wolstenholme & Katherine Elliott eds., 1974).
43 See Kaci Hickox, Caught Between Civil Liberties and Public Safety Fears: Personal Reflections from a Healthcare Provider Treating Ebola, 11 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 9, 17 (2015); see
also Gostin et al., supra note 30, at 76 n.51.
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Agendas in water law, and identifies the Red Agenda as another critical aim
of water law. Part I also identifies epidemiological concepts, including Bradley Classifications of diseases, which form essential trans-disciplinary bridges
between law and epidemiology.44 Part II explains the ways in which laws that
were developed in pursuit of the Blue and Green Agenda conflict with or
frustrate the aims of the Red Agenda in the implementation of water
policy.45
Part III discusses how “silo thinking” and “attenuated decision-making”
explain why the Blue and Green Agenda are sometimes pursued in ways that
interfere with the Red Agenda. Part III also proposes three reforms to more
effectively integrate the Red Agenda into water law, including more nuanced
water quality standards to prioritize disease prevention, greater assessment of
disease vector considerations in the planning of water development projects,
and a reinterpretation of the human right to water and a clean environment
to account for water-related epidemics. The pursuit of the Red Agenda
requires viewing infectious disease epidemics as inextricably tied to water
resource management. The tri-color framework is thus a way to conceptualize water policy in a holistic way consistent with the “water, sanitation, and
hygiene” (WASH) movement in international development and integrated
water resource management (IWRM) in domestic water policy reform.46
In the same way law was driven by epidemiology in the wake of John
Snow’s removal of the Broad Street pump handle, epidemiology should be a
driving consideration in the development and implementation of water law
and policy. By removing the pump handle, Snow effectively and appropriately integrated Red with Blue—disease prevention and water access. By
advocating for regulation of sewage discharges, Snow integrated the Red
Agenda with the Green Agenda. Despite Snow’s success, one of the greatest
global threats to humans today remains microbial pathogens. That threat to
human life is inevitably connected to water, one of the necessities of life. The
manner in which water law was honed in the time of cholera provides a guide
to how water law should be reformed today.
I.

WATER LAW’S BLUE, GREEN,

AND

RED AGENDAS

The bounds of what can be called “water law” are difficult to draw.
Water is embedded in virtually all products, a concept called virtual water.47
44 Bradley, supra note 42; see also David J. Bradley, The Epidemiology of Ricefield-Associated
Diseases, in VECTOR-BORNE DISEASE CONTROL IN HUMANS THROUGH RICE AGROECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 29 (W.H. Smith ed., 1988).
45 By “agendas,” I do not mean special interest groups or approaches to public policy
advocacy, but categories of goals pursued in law and policy generally.
46 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 36, at 942–43; Camille Pannu, Drinking
Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from California’s Central Valley, 100 CAL. L. REV. 223, 244–45
(2012); Global Water, Sanitation, & Hygiene (WASH), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/global/index.html.
47 J.A. Allan, Virtual Water—The Water, Food, and Trade Nexus: Useful Concept or Misleading Metaphor?, 28 WATER INT’L 106 (2003).
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The concept of virtual water blurs the distinction between water law and laws
governing food, energy, and trade.48 Water is often understandably referred
to as a human right, and is indeed incorporated as an express right in the
constitutions of forty-one nations.49 Water is also frequently viewed as a valuable property right, and thus central to land use and real estate law.50 Water
policy has obvious implications for public health law, housing law, public
lands management, climate change adaptation and mitigation, and environmental law.51 Water access is a major issue in gender and racial inequality.52
International trade in virtual water, combined with the role of water in international human rights, terrorism, and armed conflict makes water a major
issue in many aspects of international law.53 Water law thus can quickly take
on the “law of the horse” problem.54
For the purposes of this Article, however, water law means those laws
that explicitly govern the ownership, transfer, use, consumption, diversion,
pollution, treatment, or distribution of water and water-related infrastructure. Water law thus includes water rights, prevention and remediation of
water pollution in the natural environment, and the treatment, distribution,
and pricing of drinking water and wastewater. Water law also includes laws
aimed at drought and flood resiliency, including infrastructure development
and management for irrigation, reservoir storage, desalination, and flood
control. Water law, thus defined, is largely focused on the Blue and Green
agendas. This Part summarizes those two primary agendas of water law, and
introduces the Red Agenda as an essential group of aims that should be
incorporated more fully and explicitly into water law.
A.

Water Law’s Blue Agenda

Water law’s Blue Agenda includes the aim to provide an equitable and
sustainable allocation of water quantity to communities and individuals. This
includes water rights and water resource development for domestic, indus48 See, e.g., Rhett B. Larson, Reconciling Energy and Food Security, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 929
(2014).
49 Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2184.
50 Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV.
679 (2008).
51 Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703 (2000).
52 See, e.g., Ben Crow & Farhana Sultana, Gender, Class, and Access to Water: Three Cases in
a Poor and Crowded Delta, 15 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 709 (2002); Daria Roithmayr, Lessons
from Mazibuko: Persistent Inequality and the Commons, 3 CONST. CT. REV. 317 (2010).
53 RHETT LARSON, CANADIAN GLOBAL AFF. INST., THE CASE OF CANADIAN BULK WATER
EXPORTS (2015), http://www.cgai.ca/canadian_bulk_water_exports; see also Rhett B. Larson, War and Water, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/rhett-b-larson/war-and-water_b_5940892.html.
54 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207
(arguing against the study of many areas of law impacting a certain industry, rather than
general principles of law, because such an approach leads to a shallow understanding of
essential principles of law).
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trial, hydroelectric, and agricultural uses. At the international level, water
law pursues the Blue Agenda in several ways. International transboundary
water allocation regimes seek to equitably apportion international rivers,
lakes, and aquifers between nations sharing those resources.55 Such regimes
include regional transboundary river treaties, like the 1944 Rivers Treaty that
governs hydro-diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico.56
Other regimes include larger framework treaties, like the UN Convention on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the
“Watercourses Convention”), that embody customary international law.57
The allocation of international rivers and lakes is often made based on principles of reasonable and equitable utilization, the duty to avoid significant
harm, and the obligation to cooperate with co-riparian states.58 In determining the reasonableness and equity of allocating water between nations, international law considers several factors, including physical and climatic
conditions, existing uses on the river, population and possible future uses,
and the potential for conservation.59 In making these international transboundary allocations, “special regard” is to be given to “vital human needs.”60
There is a corollary to this approach to transboundary water allocation
and the Blue Agenda in domestic U.S. water law. When states share transboundary water sources, domestic water law typically governs the allocation
of those resources between states in two ways. The first is through the U.S.
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, in which case the Court allocates water
55 A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 369,
397 (2009).
56 Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1219 (1944 Rivers Treaty). The 1944
Rivers Treaty is one of several treaties that departs significantly from the current approach
to international transboundary water treaties and evolving customary international law, in
that it apportions a specified quantity of raw water (i.e., 1.5 million acre-feet to Mexico),
without consideration of equitable factors like those addressed in more recent international water treaties.
57 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 36 I.L.M. 703 (1997) [hereinafter Watercourses Convention]. For an
overview of the development of the Watercourses Convention, see Gabriel E. Eckstein,
Development of International Water Law and the UN Watercourse Convention, in HYDROPOLITICS
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 81 (Anthony Turton &
Roland Henwood eds., 2002). For an evaluation of the Watercourses Convention as customary international law, see Ryan B. Stoa, The United Nations Watercourses Convention on the
Dawn of Entry into Force, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1321 (2014).
58 See, e.g., Ziyi Huang, Case Study on the Water Management of the Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra River, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 229 (2015); Jian Ke & Qi Gao, Only One Mekong:
Developing Transboundary EIA Procedures of Mekong River Basin, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 950
(2013); Anna Schulz, Creating a Legal Framework for Good Transboundary Water Governance in
the Zambezi and Incomati River Basins, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2007).
59 Watercourses Convention, supra note 57, art. 6. For a general overview of the factors considered in equitably apportioning interstate watercourses, see STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 76–77 (2001).
60 Watercourses Convention, supra note 57, art. 10.
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in dispute between states based on principles of equitable apportionment.61
The factors considered under an analysis of equitable apportionment include
physical and climatic conditions, existing uses on the river, population and
anticipated future uses, rates of return flows, availability of storage, and wasteful water uses.62 The second approach is for states to agree to water apportionment under a congressionally-authorized interstate compact.63 Even in
the case of interstate river compacts, however, the Supreme Court will apply
principles of equitable apportionment in interpreting compact language and
in allocating damages for violations of compact provisions.64
Equity, therefore, is a primary aim in the allocation of transboundary
waters at both the international and U.S. domestic levels, and both levels of
law consider factors that are strikingly similar when evaluating equitable allocation. Equitable allocation of transboundary resources is thus one of the
primary aims of the Blue Agenda.65 As for equitably apportioning water
resources outside the context of transboundary waters, one approach is to
treat water as a constitutional, or human, right.66 Currently, forty-one
nations have a constitutionally-recognized right to water.67 There is a growing chorus of voices calling for recognition of an international human right
to water.68 In the United States, California has recently enacted its own
“Human Right to Water Bill,” and water shutoffs in Detroit have increased
calls for recognition of the human right to water domestically.69 The formu61 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For a discussion of the principles of equitable apportionment, see Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
62 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
63 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3. For a general discussion of the strengths, weaknesses,
and potential reforms associated with interstate river compacts, see Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 36.
64 Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) (applying the equitable remedy of disgorgement in a dispute between Kansas and Nebraska over water rights to the shared
Republic River, which is governed by an interstate compact).
65 Colorado, 459 U.S. at 183 (“Our aim is always to secure a just and equitable apportionment ‘without quibbling over formulas.’” (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S.
336, 343 (1931))).
66 See generally Fitzmaurice, supra note 31; Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note
36.
67 Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2184; see also Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 32–33 (2011).
68 See G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶¶ 5, 8, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 U.N. Resolution] (acknowledging that
access to drinking water is an integral component of expanding human rights); see also
Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, PAC. INST. 1 (2007); Stephen C. McCaffrey, A
Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7
(1992); Anna F.S. Russell, International Organizations and Human Rights: Realizing, Resisting
or Repackaging the Right to Water?, 9 J. HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2010).
69 CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(a) (West 2016). See generally INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
CLINIC, U.C. BERKELEY, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER BILL IN CALIFORNIA: AN IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR STATE AGENCIES (2013) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER BILL IN
CALIFORNIA], http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Water_Report_2013_Interactive_FINAL
.pdf; see also Kate Galbraith, Ireland Sets Water Fees, Angering Thousands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
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lation of the human right to water, at the domestic and international levels,
often leaves open for interpretation critical questions, including the amount,
price, and proximity to the point of use necessary to satisfy such a right.70
Nevertheless, the Blue Agenda aims to answer these questions and to achieve
the equitable allocation of water between nations, communities, and
individuals.
Water as an inalienable right to all is a principle embedded in one of the
most influential global legal systems—Sharia law. Unsurprisingly, given its
roots in the arid Arab peninsula, Sharia law addresses in significant depth the
issue of water rights and water disputes.71 There are two fundamental water
rights precepts under Sharia law.72 First, shafa, or the “right of thirst,” establishes a universal right for all humans to quench their thirst and that of their
animals.73 Second, shirb, or the right of irrigation, provides a right for farmers to water their crops.74 While the two principles of shafa and shirb are
interpreted and implemented in dramatically different ways depending on
geography and sect, there are certain generalizable principles, including a
focus on equity in water distribution.75 And while many Muslim-majority
nations do not formally codify Sharia water law concepts like shafa and shirb,
the concepts are nevertheless reflected in many water codes throughout the
Middle East and North Africa given the influence of the Majalla, or Ottoman
Code, on water resource management.76 The Majalla creates a certain
degree of uniformity within the region with respect to water, including the
equity considerations inherent in shafa and shirb.77
In many Western nations, one way in which water law attempts to
achieve equitable allocation of water is in the assignment of property rights
in water. Because of its roots in English common law and Roman law and the
colonial legacy of both of those legal systems, the allocation of property
rights in water under a riparian regime is relatively common around the
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/business/international/Ireland-sets-waterfees-angering-thousands.html?_r=0; Alisa Priddle & Matt Helms, Bankruptcy Judge Tells
Detroit to Address Water Shutoffs, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014) http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2014/07/16/detroit-bankruptcy-water/12734925/.
70 See generally Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36.
71 Indeed, the word “Sharia” itself is closely related to water, and can be interpreted to
mean “the source of water.” James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 94, 100 (2006).
72 Naser I. Faruqui, Water, Human Rights, and Economic Instruments: The Islamic Perspective, 9/10 WATER NEPAL 197, 201–03 (2001).
73 See also Chibli Mallat, The Quest for Water Use Principles: Reflections on Shari‘a and Custom in the Middle East, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL
IMPLICATIONS 127 (J.A. Allan & Chibli Mallat, eds., 1995).
74 Faruqui, supra note 72, at 201–03.
75 Id.; see also Mallat, supra note 73.
76 Ali Ahmad, Islamic Water Law as a Comparative Model for Maintaining Water Quality, 5
J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 159 (2000).
77 Id.; see also Munther J. Haddadin, Evolution of Water Administration and Legislation, in
WATER RESOURCES IN JORDAN: EVOLVING POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT,
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28, 28–52 (Munther J. Haddadin ed., 2006).
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world.78 Riparian regimes allocate water rights to those owning land abutting a waterbody.79 Such owners have a right to make “reasonable” use of the
water, with rights to “natural” uses being presumed reasonable and effectively
unlimited, while rights to “artificial uses” are subject to the court’s evaluation
of the relative interests of co-riparian parties.80 A natural use is one satisfying
basic needs, including bathing, drinking, and household cleaning.81 All
other rights would be artificial, and subject to the reasonableness requirement.82 Thus, riparian rights systems include an equity component reflective
of that in transboundary water law and the human right to water, where basic
human needs are prioritized and water users have an obligation to behave
reasonably in their respective water uses.
In the western United States, rights to water are apportioned under the
prior appropriation doctrine, which is a “first-in-time, first-in-rights” allocation regime.83 Nevertheless, a right under prior appropriation is not perfected until put to beneficial use.84 As is true generally of riparian rights
regimes, in prior appropriation, water is owned by the state and held in trust
for the benefit of all citizens.85 One important way in which the state asserts
its trust authority over water resources in prior appropriation jurisdictions is
by retaining authority to reject applications for water rights, applications to
transfer water rights, or to change diversion points on a river, if those actions
would adversely impact public safety or are otherwise against the public welfare.86 The beneficial use requirement of prior appropriation, applied and
78 See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 53, 61 (2011); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV.
641, 642 (1923).
79 JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 154–57 (3d. ed. 2000);
Marion Rice Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1948).
80 Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 499–500. See generally Frank
J. Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEX. L.
REV. 24 (1954).
81 Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream
Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 416.
82 Arthur S. Haddaway, Note, Water Rights—Is a Water Right an Easement?, 7 TEX. L.
REV. 453, 468 (1929).
83 Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 445, 467 (2008). Many western states rely on prior appropriation in allocating rights
to groundwater, while others have bifurcated systems where surface water is governed by
prior appropriation and groundwater is governed by a reasonable use regime similar to
riparian rights. See ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE
FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATER 29–32 (2002).
84 Reed D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western
Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675, 676 (2012); Christine A. Klein, The Constitutional
Mythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 349 (1995).
85 Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 825, 836 (2008); see also Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust
Doctrine: A Lakeside View into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 136 (2012).
86 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45–153 (2016); Consuelo Bokum, Implementing the
Public Welfare Requirement in New Mexico’s Water Code, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 681, 683–85
(1996).
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enforced through the public trust doctrine, is essentially a question of equity
in the allocation of water rights.87
Another layer of U.S. water law further supports the pursuit of equitable
allocation of water rights. For reservations of federal land, including reservations created for Native American tribes, the minimum amount of water is
implicitly reserved to meet the primary purpose of the reservation.88 Such
reserved rights—often referred to as “Winters rights”—support national forests, wildlife refuges, and the homelands of indigenous peoples.89 These
rights for tribes are quantified with an eye toward establishing a permanent
homeland. While typically quantified based on the reservation’s practicably
irrigable acreage, water rights settlement agreements and some state courts
have taken a more nuanced, reservation-specific approach aimed at achieving an equitable allocation to the tribe.90 As such, the tribal water rights
regime, consistent with other approaches to water rights in the United States,
primarily seeks an equitable allocation of water rights.91
Federally-reserved Winters rights, the beneficial use requirement in prior
appropriation law, and the role of the public trust doctrine, arguably act as
proxies for the reasonable use requirement in riparianism, and as a corollary
to the equity considerations that are paramount in transboundary water law
and the human right to water. Equitable allocation of water resources,
broadly defined, is the touchstone and primary aim of the Blue Agenda.
One of the ways in which this aim is advanced both domestically and
internationally is through the financing and development of water infrastructure, including in particular reservoirs, drinking water treatment plants and
distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, and irrigation systems.92
The World Bank plays a major role at the international level in financing

87 A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J.
769 (2001); John G. Tisdell, Equity and Social Justice in Water Doctrines, 4 SOC. JUST. RES. 401
(2003).
88 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
89 Winters, 207 U.S. at 564; A. Dan Tarlock, Tribal Justice and Property Rights: The Evolution of Winters v. United States, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 471 (2010).
90 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595–601 (1963); see also In re Gen. Adjudication
of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 78–80 (Ariz. 2001);
Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights: Litigation and Settlements, 42 TULSA L. REV. 23,
30–31 (2006).
91 Tarlock, supra note 89, at 493; see also Jeremy N. Jungreis, “Permit” Me Another Drink:
A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water Rights of Federal Lands in the Regulated Riparian East, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 378, n.75 (2005); Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced
Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 711–12
(1997).
92 Elizabeth C. Black, Climate Change Adaptation: Local Solutions for a Global Problem, 22
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (2010); Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to
Developing Countries via Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91 (1995).
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major water infrastructure projects.93 The World Bank Inspection Panel provides a forum in which to arbitrate disputes associated with the application of
international and domestic law to water infrastructure development.94 Additionally, the World Bank utilizes an impact assessment process to evaluate the
environmental impacts of its projects.95 Under international law, including
the Espoo Convention, similar requirements for conducting environmental
impact assessments apply to water resource development projects, like infrastructure for water treatment, distribution, and storage.96
Similarly, in the United States, federal water development projects,
including dams and reservoirs built, maintained, and operated by federal
agencies like the Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and
Tennessee Valley Authority, are subject to political and judicial oversight and
ex ante environmental assessment requirements under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).97 Privately-financed water infrastructure
developments must typically obtain federal permits that likewise are subject
to NEPA requirements and judicial oversight.98 The promotion and regulation, including public financing, of water infrastructure development
projects represents one of the key means through which water law pursues
the Blue Agenda.
Equity is the express and implied aim of the Blue Agenda; however, that
aim is not always reflected in the implementation and interpretation of laws
and policy enacted in pursuit of the Blue Agenda.99 The Blue Agenda pursues equitable allocation through rights allocation, conservation incentives,
subsidies for water development, and water markets and water pricing.
Because water law ostensibly aims for both inter-generational and intragenerational equitable allocation of water, it is not always implemented in a
93 See supra note 92; see also Adam McBeth, A Right by Any Other Name: The Evasive
Engagement of International Financial Institutions with Human Rights, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 1101, 1130 (2009).
94 Yaser Khalaileh, Prospects for Cooperation and Dispute over Water in the Middle East, 5
BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 73 (2012); John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western
Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355 (2005).
95 Martin V. Totaro, Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and International Human Rights
Law: The Case of Participatory Development, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 719, 758–59 (2008).
96 United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 30 I.L.M. 800 (Feb. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Espoo Convention]; see also
Ke & Gao, supra note 58, at 978–79; Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The GabcikovoNagymaros Dispute and International Freshwater Law, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 290, 322–23
(1996).
97 Leonard B. Dworsky et al., Water Resources Planning and Management in the United
States Federal System: Long Term Assessment and Intergovernmental Issues, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J.
475, 518 (1991).
98 Id.; see also Kenneth S. Weiner, NEPA and State NEPAs: Learning from the Past, Foresight
for the Future, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10675, 10676–77 (2009).
99 See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions:
Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 (2006); Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671
(1993).
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way that is likely to effectively achieve those aims.100 This is not a question of
whether the Blue Agenda exists, but whether the Blue Agenda is failing.
That is a question that lies outside the scope of this Article.
B.

Water Law’s Green Agenda

Water law’s Green Agenda includes the aim to prevent or remediate pollution of aquatic ecosystems and to establish and enforce healthy drinking
water quality standards for toxic or carcinogenic chemicals.101 The Green
Agenda also seeks to ensure adequate water supplies to support aquatic, wetland, and riparian ecosystems.102 In many ways, the Blue Agenda reinforces
the Green Agenda. For example, the environmental impact assessments associated with federal projects in the United States, the Espoo Convention, and
World Bank-financed projects aim to mitigate or avoid environmental
impacts from water development projects intended to improve water
access.103 Furthermore, many water rights regimes provide for water to be
allocated to environmental in-stream flows for habitat preservation and
protection.104
Pursuit of the Green Agenda at the international level has many parallels
with the international pursuit of the Blue Agenda as well. As with the Blue
Agenda, treaty law governs certain aspects of the protection of water
resources at the international level.105 Customary international law also creates obligations on states to avoid extraterritorial environmental harms,
100 See David H. Getches, Colorado River Governance: Sharing Federal Authority as an Incentive to Create a New Institution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 573, 576–77 (1997); see also Ardi Imseis,
On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 65,
105–06 (2003).
101 See, e.g., Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 215–16 (2014) (evaluating the
role of permitting and standards regimes in environmental protection); Lisa Heinzerling,
Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 57–64 (1999) (discussing the role of
cost-benefit analysis and discount rates in regulating water quality); James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 877–88 (2005)
(evaluating the role of market mechanisms for protecting the environment).
102 Freyfogle, supra note 80, at 486; Benjamin A. Kahn, The Legal Framework Surrounding
Maori Claims to Water Resources in New Zealand: In Contrast to the American Indian Experience, 35
STAN. J. INT’L L. 49, 56 (1999); Christine A. Klein, Water Bankruptcy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 560,
568 (2012); Luis Inaraja Vera, Instream Flows in California and Spain: The Thorny Issue of
Compensation, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 199 (2015).
103 See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002).
104 See, e.g., Marc Becker, Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador, 38 LATIN AM. PERSP. 47, 47 (2010); Janet C. Neuman & Michael C. Blumm,
Water for National Forests: The Bypass Flow Report and the Great Divide in Western Water Law, 18
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8 (1999).
105 See, e.g., Final Act of the International Conference on the Conservation of Wetlands
and Waterfowl, 11 I.L.M. 963 (1972) (Ramsar Convention); see also Meredith A. Giordano,
Managing the Quality of International Rivers: Global Principles and Basin Practice, 43 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 111, 113–18 (2003).
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including the contamination of transboundary water bodies.106 Advocates
for the protection and remediation of water resources have also relied on
international human rights arguments, including the right to a clean environment.107 International law has begun a possible shift toward the development and implementation of regulatory regimes whereby water quality
standards are established and enforced, and discharges to water bodies are
regulated by permits.108
This recent development in international law has its roots in domestic
law’s pursuit of the Green Agenda, where water quality is protected by establishing water quality standards and issuing permits for discharges to water
bodies. In England, prior to the nineteenth-century cholera outbreaks, water
pollution was largely addressed through suits under common law, under theories of tort or nuisance.109 John Snow’s testimony before Parliament led to
reforms in water quality protection in the United Kingdom, beginning with
criminal sanctions for water pollution and evolving to a licensing system for
discharges to rivers.110 Other countries have taken a similar approach with
respect to water quality standards and water discharge permits, including
China, South Africa, Australia, and Brazil.111

106 Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International Commons: The Case of Desalination Under
International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 779–82; Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for
Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 955 (1997).
107 See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and Hydraulic Fracturing: A Human
Right to a Clean Environment, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289 (2012); Stephen C. McCaffrey & Kate J. Neville, Small Capacity and Big Responsibilities: Financial and Legal Implications of
a Human Right to Water for Developing Countries, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 697–98
(2009).
108 See generally Pál Belényesi, Regulation of Water Services in the EU, 2014 EUR. NETWORKS
L. & REG. Q. 17. For an overview of water quality permitting approaches and international
water quality protection law, see ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 554–80 (2015).
109 See Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental
Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2007) (summarizing the history of common
law suits related to environmental contamination and arguing that common law
approaches will fill in regulatory gaps where federal law has failed to adequately prevent or
mitigate pollution); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the
Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545 (2007) (arguing for the integration of state common
law approaches to environmental protection and federal regulation).
110 William Howarth, Water Quality and Land Use Regulation Under the Water Framework
Directive, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 351 (2006); Larson, supra note 16, at 3, 6.
111 See, e.g., Chris Calfee, Some, for All, for Ever: Defending the Constitutionality of South
Africa’s National Water Act of 1998, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 57 (2001); David N.
Cassuto & Rômulo S.R. Sampaio, Water Law in the United States and Brazil—Climate Change
& Two Approaches to Emerging Water Poverty, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 371
(2011); Rosemary Lyster, Common but Differentiated? Australia’s Response to Global Climate
Change, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 561 (2004); Wang Mingyuan, China’s Pollutant Discharge Permit System Evolves Behind Its Economic Expansion, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 95 (2008).
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The United States takes a similar approach in pursuing the Green
Agenda under the Clean Water Act (CWA).112 Under the CWA, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in partnership with state governments granted primacy to implement the CWA, regulates water quality
throughout the United States in surface waters deemed “waters of the United
States.”113 The meaning of “waters of the United States,” and thus the scope
of the CWA’s jurisdiction, has been the source of ongoing legal battles and
efforts at legislative and regulatory reforms. In general, the jurisdiction is
defined broadly to include any surface water with a “significant nexus” to a
traditional navigable watercourse.114 For such waters, state governments
establish surface water quality standards (SWQS) within their states under
CWA jurisdiction and with EPA oversight and approval.115 Surface water
quality standards are established at both acute and chronic levels of listed
contaminants, and each of those standards is intended to protect different
designated uses of the water body, including wildlife habitat, fishing, bathing,
and drinking.116
States regularly assesses each watercourse for compliance with the applicable SWQS.117 Surface watercourses that fail to meet SWQS are deemed
“impaired” for the constituents exceeding standards.118 The state then establishes for each impaired watercourse a “total maximum daily load”
(TMDL).119 Under section 303(d) of the CWA, a TMDL is a calculation of
the maximum amount of a pollutant a watercourse can receive and still meet
112 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). For an overview of federal and state partnerships in the
implementation of the Clean Water Act, see ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT
AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 9–10 (2d ed. 2009).
113 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. For an overview of the CWA and its implementing regulations, see JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW &
POLICY 123–46 (2003).
114 In 2006, in Rapanos v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held in a
plurality decision (meaning a decision in which no single holding garnered the support of
a majority of the Court) that a watercourse falls within CWA jurisdiction under certain
circumstances. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). The plurality opinion, written by Justice Antonin
Scalia, held that CWA jurisdiction adheres only to traditional navigable waters, relatively
permanent tributaries to traditional navigable waters, and wetlands directly abutting traditional navigable waters. Id. at 733–34. The concurring opinion authored by Justice
Anthony Kennedy held that CWA jurisdiction adheres so long as a water body has a “significant nexus” to a traditional navigable water. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115 33 U.S.C. § 1251; see also Larson, supra note 38, at 1000–02. For a discussion of
multi-level governance in environmental law, see Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and
Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011).
116 Larson, supra note 38, at 1000–02; see also SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 113, at
145–55.
117 Larson, supra note 38, at 1000–02; see also Philip Weinberg, Federal-State Relationships,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW § 41.01 (Michael B.
Gerrard ed., 1992).
118 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1313(c)–(d); 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(j) (2001).
119 Supra note 118; see also SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 113, at 150–66.
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SWQS.120 The TMDL is then used to establish effluent limitations for discharge permits into the impaired watercourse.121 These permits, issued
under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) of section 302 of the CWA, authorize point source discharges of pollutants to CWAjurisdictional waters.122 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers oversees and
implements a separate permitting system under section 404 of the CWA for
dredge and fill projects, which are typically required for dam construction
and diversion projects, and as such, another example of the intersection of
the Blue and Green Agendas.123
Groundwater quality protection at the local and national level has taken
a similar standards/permit approach to command and control regulation of
water pollution.124 Such permits are often implemented under state law in
the United States, but the federal government permits groundwater discharges in the Underground Injection Control (UIC) program of the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA).125 Frequently, the standards applied in
groundwater quality permitting are similar, if not identical, to the standards
applied to protect drinking water sources or for treated drinking water.126
In the United States and internationally, quality standards for drinking
water—meaning water treated for purposes of human consumption and
delivered to the point of use—are aimed primarily at the protection of
human health.127 In the United States, drinking water quality standards or
120 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); see also Victor B. Flatt, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Law: Why the
Clean Water Act Has Never Grown Up, 55 ALA. L. REV. 595, 599 (2004) (noting the failure of
the TMDL program to effectively address water quality due to a lack of enforceable timetables absent court orders).
121 See supra note 118; see also Larson, supra note 38.
122 See supra note 118; see also Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 302 (1995) (discussing how command and control regimes, like the
CWA, dictate technology implementation without necessarily making precise decisions on
permissible levels of pollution).
123 33 U.S.C. § 1344; see also Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick
in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 54 (2002).
124 See generally Debbie Sivas, Groundwater Pollution from Agricultural Activities: Policies for
Protection, 7 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 117 (1988); Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into
Groundwater: The Crucial Link in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 569 (1988).
125 See, e.g.; 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(A) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-241 (2016);
New Mexico’s Discharge Permit Program, 8 N.M. Reg. 676 (Aug. 15, 2002) (noting the
applicable sections at § 20.6.2.5101). For an overview of the UIC program and the recently
enacted exceptions to UIC for hydraulic fracturing, see Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters:
The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115 (2009).
126 Id.; see also Charles B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Cost of Restoration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 417, 449 (1997); Janet S. Herman et al., Groundwater Ecosystems and the
Service of Water Purification, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 479, 482–83 (2001).
127 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4) (providing maximum contaminant levels to protect human health). For a discussion of the challenges and uncertainty
associated with the science behind establishing drinking water quality standards, see
Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181,
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“maximum contaminant levels” (MCLs), are set at a level as close as feasible
to a level at which there are no known or anticipated health impacts.128 The
concept of feasibility, in the case of MCLs, takes into consideration treatment
costs.129 Internationally, many domestic drinking water-quality standards are
based on the World Health Organization’s (WHO) drinking water quality
standards, which are also the standards relied upon by the World Bank in
financing drinking water treatment and distribution systems.130 As with
MCLs, the WHO drinking water quality standards are explicitly based on a
cost/benefit analysis and technical feasibility considerations.131
The combination of standards and permitting applied to discharge permits and water quality protection is similarly oriented toward feasibility and
efficiency.132 The objective of this standards/permit approach applied to
water quality protection is to balance concerns for environmental integrity
and human health against interests in economic development and the economic and technical feasibility of preventive or remedial actions aimed at
water pollution.133 This balancing of interests and pragmatic consideration
of costs can be broadly defined as efficiency.134 Water law’s Green Agenda is
vulnerable to arguments that it fails to acceptably achieve efficient outcomes.135 Additionally, the Green Agenda arguably inappropriately priori209–11. For a discussion of the human health-oriented approach to the establishment of
drinking water quality standards, see James Salzman, Is It Safe to Drink the Water?, 19 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2008).
128 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A)–g-1(d).
129 Id.; see also Arden Rowell, Allocating Pollution, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 999–1000
(2012).
130 Aaron Ezroj, How the European Union’s WEEE & ROHS Directives Can Help the United
States Develop a Successful National E-Waste Strategy, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 71–72 (2010);
Diane M. Kohn, Note, Setting a Standard: Environmental Impact Assessment Policies of Multilateral Development Banks and Export Credit Agencies, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 281, 286 (2002).
131 Salzman, supra note 127, at 39; see also Hugo Tremblay, A Clash of Paradigms in the
Water Sector? Tensions and Synergies Between Integrated Water Resources Management and the
Human Rights-Based Approach to Development, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 307, 351–52 (2011).
132 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 270–73 (1974) (discussing the efficiency considerations associated with permit
systems for water pollution control); Heinzerling, supra note 122, at 300 (evaluating the
impacts of pollution permit systems and their orientation toward efficiency and cost/benefit analysis); Louis J. Kotzé & Rebecca Bates, Similar but Different: Comparative Perspectives on
Access to Water in Australia and South Africa, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 221, 257 (2012)
(comparing the role of efficiency and cost-benefit analysis in the water quality permitting
regimes of Australia and South Africa).
133 See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, The Decline and (Possible) Renewal of the Aspiration in the
Clean Water Act, 88 WASH. L. REV. 759, 795–96 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of
Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2259 (2002).
134 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 112 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 2004) (1990).
135 See, e.g., Mark A. Latham, (Un)Restoring the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity of
Our Nation’s Waters: The Emerging Clean Water Act Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 28 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 411 (2010); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010) (providing a critique of feasibility analyses like those applied to
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tizes efficient protection over maximum protection or some other goal for
the protection of human health and the environment.136 Nevertheless, the
express language of water quality statutes and regulation and the implied
intent in their implementation evince that efficiency is a major, if not the
primary, goal of such regulatory regimes.137 As such, the combined primary
aims of the Blue and Green Agendas of water law are equity in water distribution and efficiency in the promotion and protection of water quality.138
Despite the breadth and importance of these aims, water law nevertheless
remains incomplete in the scope and significance of its aspirations and
influence.
C.

Water Law’s Red Agenda

Water law and policy should more highly prioritize, and more effectively
integrate, the Red Agenda. The Red Agenda aims domestic and international water law toward preventing and mitigating the outbreak of communicable diseases.139 The Red Agenda focuses on managing the interaction
between human communities and the aquatic habitats of disease vectors in
the development of water delivery infrastructure, and prioritizes prevention,
treatment, and mitigation of waterborne pathogens in the development of
drinking water systems.140 While the Green Agenda focuses on protecting
human health from contaminants, the Red Agenda focuses on protection
from pathogens.
To the extent the Red Agenda is already part of water law and policy, it is
only in two small ways. First, the Red Agenda is arguably a minor appendage
to the Green Agenda’s general protection of human health and its pursuit of
“clean water” by, for example, establishing drinking water standards for fecal
coliforms or discharge permits for wastewater treatment plants.141 Second,
the EPA’s water quality protection programs); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms,
and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2001) (analyzing the failure of environmental law to curb environmental harms caused by farms).
136 See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1603, 1633–36 (2013); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and ‘Fine-Tuning’ Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985).
See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35 (2004).
137 John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999).
138 See Richard O. Zerbe Jr., An Integration of Equity and Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 349
(1998) (discussing the difficulties of aligning equity and efficiency in achieving public policy results).
139 See, e.g., Julia A. Jones, Comment, International Control of Cholera: An Environmental
Perspective to Infectious Disease Control, 74 IND. L.J. 1035 (1999).
140 See, e.g., Elizabeth Cooper, Social Risk and the Transformation of Public Health Law:
Lessons from the Plague Years, 86 IOWA L. REV. 869 (2001).
141 Mary Jane Angelo & Jon Morris, Maintaining a Healthy Water Supply While Growing a
Healthy Food Supply: Legal Tools for Cleaning up Agricultural Water Pollution, 62 U. KAN. L. REV.
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the Red Agenda is incidentally pursued along with the Blue Agenda’s goal of
sufficient water quantity, in which case human health is improved through
access to water for hygiene and sanitation.142 Nevertheless, as argued below,
these minor nods toward the Red Agenda are not only inadequate to address
the massive global problem of communicable disease epidemics, but frequently, the pursuit of the Blue and Green Agendas interferes with the Red
Agenda.
Advancing the Red Agenda and more effectively integrating it within
water law and policy requires understanding the inexorable link between
communicable disease and water management.143 One of the most important ways in which this connection between water and communicable diseases
has been framed is in the functional classification of diseases by route of
transmission, commonly referred to as Bradley Classifications in epidemiology.144 The Bradley Classifications divide communicable diseases into four
classes depending on the type of agent and transmission route, all of which
are associated with water.145 What is striking about the Bradley Classification
system is how many major communicable diseases fit into one of these four
water-related classes.
The first class includes waterborne infections.146 Waterborne infections
are those that occur by directly ingesting the microbial pathogen.147 Waterborne infections include cholera, typhoid, Cryptosporidium, giardia, E. coli,
1003, 1033 (2014) (noting the ostensible goal of water pollution law as the protection of
human health). But see Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 361, 368–69 (2012) (noting the commentators who have argued that water
quality protection laws have failed to adequately protect human health).
142 See, e.g., Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a
Human Right and the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331 (2005)
(discussing the role of the human right to access water in improving human health);
Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, and the
Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 99–100 (2013) (discussing the
impacts for human health associated with an effective human right to sanitation). But see
Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 36, at 924 (discussing the limits of the human right
to water in protecting human health).
143 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Removing the “Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”: Pollution
Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
149, 164 (2007); see also STEVEN JOHNSON, THE GHOST MAP: THE STORY OF LONDON’S MOST
TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC—AND HOW IT CHANGED SCIENCE, CITIES, AND THE MODERN WORLD
30–44, 103–05 (2006) (describing the relationship between the management of water and
sanitation and cholera epidemics in nineteenth-century London).
144 GILBERT F. WHITE ET AL., DRAWERS OF WATER: DOMESTIC WATER USE IN EAST AFRICA
(1972); see also J. Bartram & R. Carr, An Introduction to Emerging Waterborne Zoonoses and
General Control Principles, in WATERBORNE ZOONOSES: IDENTIFICATION, CAUSES, AND CONTROL
17, 18 (J.A. Cotruvo et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter WATERBORNE ZOONOSES].
145 WHITE ET AL., supra note 144; see also D.D. Mara & R.G.A. Feachem, Water- and
Excreta-Related Diseases: Unitary Environmental Classification, 125 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 334
(1999).
146 WHITE ET AL., supra note 144.
147 Id.; see also C.L. Moe, What Are the Criteria for Determining Whether a Disease Is Zoonotic
and Water Related?, in WATERBORNE ZOONOSES, supra note 144, at 27.
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and other pathogens that can survive in water and can be transmitted
through ingestion.148 Typically, these pathogens are enteric microorganisms
introduced to the aquatic environment by fecal contamination.149 Symptoms of such diseases include abdominal pain, diarrhea, dehydration, and
fever.150 Transmission and ultimate infection depend on the degree of contamination, the survival of the pathogen in the aquatic environment, infectivity of the pathogen, and the degree of individual exposure to the
contaminated water.151 Preventative measures include improved sanitation
infrastructure to prevent fecal contamination and improved treatment of
drinking water (including disinfection by chlorine or chlorine dioxide).152
Because of generally poor sanitation and inadequate treatment, waterborne
disease outbreaks are particular deadly in the developing world.153 At least
1.8 million people die annually from waterborne diseases like cholera, with
children under the age of five constituting ninety percent of those deaths.154
Waterborne diseases constitute eighty percent of all illnesses in the developing world.155
Outbreaks of Cryptosporidium, however, are relatively common even in
developed countries.156 One outbreak in Wisconsin in 1993 infected over
400,000 people and resulted in over 100 deaths.157 Unlike bacterial pathogens like cholera and typhoid, Cryptosporidium is a protozoon that, during the
oocyst stage of its lifecycle, is remarkably resilient to traditional means of
148 Moe, supra note 147, at 31–32.
149 Id.
150 Christine L. Moe, Waterborne Transmission of Infectious Agents, in MANUAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MICROBIOLOGY 222, 222–48 (Christon J. Hurst et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., Thomas Clasen et al., Microbiological Effectiveness and Cost of Disinfecting Water
by Boiling in Semi-Urban India, 79 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. HYGIENE 407 (2008); J.V. Pinfold,
Faecal Contamination of Water and Fingertip-Rinses as a Method for Evaluating the Effect of LowCost Water Supply and Sanitation Activities on Faeco-Oral Disease Transmission II: A Hygiene Intervention Study in Rural North-East Thailand, 105 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 377 (1990); Mark
A. Shannon et al., Science and Technology for Water Purification in the Coming Decades, 452
NATURE 301 (2008).
153 See generally José Martines et al., Diarrheal Diseases, in DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 91, 91–99 (Dean T. Jamison et al. eds., 1993); see also Itzchak Kornfeld, A Global Water Apartheid: From Revelation to Resolution, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 701,
708–09 (2010).
154 Kornfeld, supra note 153, at 708. The 1.6 million children who die annually from
waterborne diseases is five times the number of deaths annually from HIV/AIDS. Id.
155 William L. Andreen, Environmental Law and International Assistance: The Challenge of
Strengthening Environmental Law in the Developing World, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 17, 18–19
(2000).
156 Ida Ngueng Feze et al., The Regulation of Novel Water Quality Assessment Biotechnologies:
Is Canada Ready to Ride the Next Wave?, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 201, 206–07 (2014).
157 Id.; see also Jeffrey P. Davis, The Massive Waterborne Outbreak of Cryptosporidium Infections, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1993, in OUTBREAK INVESTIGATIONS AROUND THE WORLD: CASE
STUDIES IN INFECTIOUS DISEASE FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY 197, 219, 223 (Mark S. Dworkin ed.,
2010).
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disinfection, including by chlorine.158 Addressing Cryptosporidium outbreaks
has required innovative approaches to drinking water treatment, including
increased and improved reliance on membrane filtration and implementation of ultraviolet radiation treatment.159
The second class includes water-washed infections.160 Such infections
arise due to inadequate water for personal and domestic hygiene.161 Waterwashed infections include shigella, trachoma, and scabies.162 Shigella is a
bacterium closely related to salmonella, and one of the leading causes of
dysentery in the world.163 Trachoma is caused by chlamydia bacteria in the
eye, and is an extreme form of conjunctivitis that can result in blindness.164
Scabies is a skin infestation of mites, and infects over 100 million people
worldwide.165 In each case, infection results in part from the lack of available
water resources to promote adequate hygiene. One of the seminal longitudinal studies associated with water-washed diseases is called Drawers of Water.166
That study demonstrated marked improvement in the health of communities
in Uganda, including significant decline in the prevalence of water-washed
infections, when water gathering containers changed from small peanut oil
cans to larger plastic jugs.167
One of the implications of Drawers of Water is the prioritization of access
to clean water for hygiene purposes in public health policy.168 The importance of water access for hygiene can be seen in the 2014 Ebola outbreak.169
One of the most significant aggravating factors of the Ebola outbreak in West
Africa was the lack of water for hygiene, and one of the reasons Ebola was
effectively contained within developed countries was the ready availability of
158 See supra note 157; see also Panagiotis Karanis et al., Waterborne Transmission of Protozoan Parasites: A Worldwide Review of Outbreaks and Lessons Learnt, 5 J. WATER & HEALTH 1, 2
(2007).
159 STEVE E. HRUDEY & ELIZABETH J. HRUDEY, ENSURING SAFE DRINKING WATER: LEARNING
FROM FRONTLINE EXPERIENCE WITH CONTAMINATION 11–21 (2014).
160 WHITE ET AL., supra note 144; see also Mara & Feachem, supra note 145, at 334.
161 Mara & Feachem, supra note 145, at 334; see also Moe, supra note 147, at 31–32.
162 Moe, supra note 150, at 226.
163 Minnie M. Mathan & V.I. Mathan, Ultrastructural Pathology of the Rectal Mucosa in
Shigella Dysentery, 123 AM. J. PATHOLOGY 25 (1986). Dysentery is the inflammation of the
intestine resulting in diarrhea with blood, and is a symptom of both bacterial infections
(like shigella) and amoebic infections (like that of Entamoeba histolytica). Id. at 37.
164 Thomas M. Lietman et al., Clinically Active Trachoma Versus Actual Chlamydial Infection, 172 MED. J. AUSTL. 93 (2000).
165 Larry G. Arlian et al., Resistance and Immune Response in Scabies-Infested Hosts Immunized with Dermatophagoides Mites, 52 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 539 (1995).
166 WHITE ET AL., supra note 144; see JOHN THOMPSON ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR ECON. DEV.,
DRAWERS OF WATER II: 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN DOMESTIC WATER USE & ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH IN EAST AFRICA (2002), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9049IIED.pdf.
167 Id. at 38.
168 Id. at 75; see also Peter H. Gleick, Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs, 21 WATER INT’L 83 (1996).
169 See generally James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 2014
Ebola Outbreak, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 595, 597 (2014).
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clean water and flushing toilets.170 The lawsuit against the UN seeking damages associated with the Haitian cholera outbreak blamed the UN for failing
to screen workers for infectious diseases.171 But just as important a factor in
the ultimate severity of the epidemic was the lack of adequate sanitation
infrastructure and clean water in Haiti.172 Had there been flushing toilets
and plenty of water for washing hands and food, cholera would likely have
flared and burned out quickly in Haiti, as it does whenever it emerges in
developed countries.173 Instead, cholera is likely now an endemic disease in
Haiti, and costs much more in terms of loss of life than the cost of adequate
sanitation.174
The third class includes water-based infections.175 Water-based infections are those in which the pathogen spends part of its life inside vectors
whose primary habitat is aquatic, like a snail or a water flea (a small crustacean).176 This aquatic vector is the primary transmission pathway into
human populations.177 Water-based infections include guinea worm and
schistosomiasis.178 A person is infected by guinea worm diseases, also called
dracunculiasis, by ingesting water containing water fleas, which carry the
guinea worm larvae.179 Schistosomiasis is a disease caused by flat worms that
are released from freshwater snails and burrow through human skin.180
Once in the human body, the lifecycle of the worm proceeds, with the worm
traveling to the lungs, liver, kidneys, bladder, and even the brain.181 Symptoms can include abdominal pain, diarrhea, and blood in the stool and
urine, and infection can lead to liver damage, kidney failure, infertility, cancer, learning disabilities, and death.182 Humans are generally infected by
swimming or wading in freshwater infested with infected snails. Schistosomiasis affects nearly 210 million people worldwide, with as many as 200,000
170 Hickox, supra note 43, at 17.
171 Ed Pilkington, Haitians Launch New Lawsuit Against UN over Thousands of Cholera
Deaths, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/11/
haiti-cholera-un-deaths-lawsuit.
172 David A. Walton & Louise C. Ivers, Responding to Cholera in Post-Earthquake Haiti, 364
N. ENGL. J. MED. 3, 4 (2011).
173 Concannon Jr. & Lindstrom, supra note 29, at 1167–68.
174 Kashmira A. Date et al., Considerations for Oral Cholera Vaccine Use During Outbreak
After Earthquake in Haiti, 2010–2011, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2105 (2011).
175 WHITE ET AL., supra note 144; see also Mara & Feachem, supra note 145, at 334–35.
176 See supra note 175.
177 See supra note 175.
178 See supra note 175.
179 Chris Greenaway, Dracunculiasis (Guinea Worm Disease), 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 495
(2004).
180 Edward J. Pearce & Andrew S. MacDonald, The Immunobiology of Schistosomiasis, 2
NATURE REVS. IMMUNOLOGY 499 (2002).
181 Allen W. Cheever, Schistosomiasis: Infection Versus Disease and Hypersensitivity Versus
Immunity, 142 AM. J. PATHOLOGY 699 (1993).
182 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL306.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 25

law in the time of cholera

21-MAR-17

12:19

1295

deaths annually.183 Like guinea worm, it is considered by the WHO to be a
neglected tropical disease in terms of invested research in treatment and
prevention.184
The fourth class includes water-related infections.185 Water-related
infections are those in which the pathogen spends part of its life in a vector
who breeds in aquatic environments, like mosquitoes or flies.186 Waterrelated infections include malaria, West Nile virus, dengue fever, yellow fever,
chikungunya, sleeping sickness, and filariasis.187 The pathogen in each case
is carried by the vector and transmitted to humans by the vector’s bite.188
These vectors breed and have their larval stage in aquatic environments.189
The health effects of the different water-related infections vary. Malaria is
the infection of a protozoan carried by mosquitoes and results in fever,
fatigue, aches, vomiting, and in severe cases, seizures, coma, and death.190
The West Nile, Zika, dengue, yellow fever, and chikungunya viral infections
have malaria-like symptoms.191
These water-related infections have varying levels of effective treatments.192 However, they represent collectively one of the greatest threats to
human life.193 Malaria alone kills between 600,000 and 900,000 people each
year.194 While the majority of water-related infections occur in developing
countries, small West Nile outbreaks are increasingly common in the developed world.195 For each of these water-related infections, and regardless of
183 Id.; see also Bruno Gryseels et al., Human Schistosomiasis, 368 LANCET 1106, 1113
(2006).
184 John O. Gyapong et al., Integration of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases into HealthCare Systems: Challenges and Opportunities, 375 LANCET 160 (2010).
185 WHITE ET AL., supra note 144; see also Mara & Feachem, supra note 145, at 334.
186 Supra note 185.
187 Supra note 185; see also Stuart Batterman et al., Sustainable Control of Water-Related
Infectious Diseases: A Review and Proposal for Interdisciplinary Health-Based Systems Research, 117
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1023 (2009).
188 Supra note 187.
189 Supra note 187; see also Gerry F. Killeen et al., Habitat Targeting for Controlling Aquatic
Stages of Malaria Vectors in Africa, 74 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. HYGIENE 517 (2006).
190 William R. Brieger, Pile Sorts as a Means of Improving the Quality of Survey Data: Malaria
Illness Symptoms, 9 HEALTH EDUC. RES. 257 (1994).
191 Dirk M. Elston, Life-Threatening Stings, Bites, Infestations, and Parasitic Diseases, 23
CLINICS IN DERMATOLOGY 164, 167–68 (2005).
192 See, e.g., Davidson H. Hamer et al., Improved Diagnostic Testing and Malaria Treatment
Practices in Zambia, 297 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2227 (2007); Zvi Shimoni et al., Treatment of West
Nile Virus Encephalitis with Intravenous Immunoglobulin, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 759
(2001).
193 Duane J. Gubler, Resurgent Vector-Borne Diseases as a Global Health Problem, 4 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 442 (1998); Atul A. Khasnis & Mary D. Nettleman, Global Warming and
Infectious Disease, 36 ARCHIVES MED. RES. 689 (2005).
194 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2014, at 32 (2014).
195 Edward B. Hayes & Duane J. Gubler, West Nile Virus: Epidemiology and Clinical Features
of an Emerging Epidemic in the United States, 57 ANN. REV. MED. 181 (2006); Sean B. Hecht,
Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559,
1575–76 (2008).
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location, vector control remains a critical measure for the prevention of
epidemics.196
A review of the Bradley Classifications emphasizes the importance of the
Red Agenda and orients its aims. First, the Red Agenda promotes improved
drinking water treatment, and prioritizes microbial pathogen disinfection in
the treatment and distribution of drinking water and in the establishment of
drinking water standards. The Red Agenda also emphasizes the role of water
law in making water available for hygiene and sanitation, and encourages
investment in sanitation infrastructure. Additionally, the Red Agenda
focuses on disease prevention, and in particular, the role of law in influencing land use, pesticide applications, and water resource development to prevent or mitigate increased intersection of disease vector habitat and human
communities. These aims of the Red Agenda can be broadly defined as resiliency to Bradley Classification infections within human communities. Resiliency, like equity and efficiency, is an expansive term with malleable
connotations. Nevertheless, it roughly captures the primary goal of the Red
Agenda, which is to save human lives and avoid or mitigate human suffering.
There are few instances in water law where the Red Agenda takes prominence. For example, the SDWA’s MCLs and the WHO’s drinking water standards set limits on fecal coliforms, and impose disinfectant requirements to
ensure adequate treatment for pathogens.197 Discharge permits for treated
wastewater are generally designed to establish effluent limits for fecal
coliforms, and surface water quality standards typically address bacteria.198
These, however, are only a few narrow instances in which water law explicitly
and directly advances the Red Agenda, and even then, it does so as part of
the broader standards and permitting scheme of the Green Agenda and only
in the context of waterborne pathogens.
The litigation relating to the UN’s role in the Haitian cholera epidemic
is illustrative of one possible approach to advancing the Red Agenda in international water law in the context of waterborne outbreaks.199 International
law could require the screening of aid workers and establish minimum sanitation practices to avoid the introduction of pathogens into an environment in
ways that would risk outbreaks.200 While the immunity claimed by the UN
196 David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 802–03 (1997); Douglas E. Norris, Mosquito-Borne Diseases
as a Consequence of Land Use Change, 1 ECOHEALTH 19 (2004).
197 William E. Cox, Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A Search for Effective Quality
Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 69, 111–12 (1997); Judith Kimerling, International Standards in Ecuador’s Amazon Oil
Fields: The Privatization of Environmental Law, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 371 n.229 (2001).
198 See, e.g., Paul W. Morenberg, Comment, Environmental Fraud by Government Contractors: A New Application of the False Claims Act, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 623, 666 n.381
(1995); see also Lee R. Okster, Smithfield Foods: A Case for Federal Action, 23 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 381 (1999).
199 Knudsen, supra note 24, at 15–16.
200 Id.; see also Rosa Freedman, UN Immunity or Impunity? A Human Rights Based Challenge, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 239, 240 (2014).
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from liability associated with the outbreak would encourage investment by
the international community in humanitarian response, the UN could establish a trust fund comparable to the compensation regimes used in black lung
cases in the United States to compensate victims of epidemics that originate
from international humanitarian projects.201 Countries investing in humanitarian aid could be required to invest a minimum percentage in a trust fund
or insurance policy aimed at compensating potential victims of disease
epidemics, and toward disease treatment, containment, and prevention.
The ongoing Zika virus outbreak spreading rapidly throughout the Western Hemisphere also provides helpful context for understanding the role of
the Red Agenda in domestic water law in the context of water-related outbreaks.202 Zika is a mosquito-borne virus similar to the dengue, West Nile,
and yellow fever viruses.203 The virus was likely brought into Brazil during
the 2014 World Cup.204 Since then, there have been over 2400 cases (compared to 147 cases the previous year), and as many as 40 deaths.205 More
alarming, however, have been the first documented cases connecting Zika
infection with microcephaly in infants.206 Microcephaly is a birth defect
resulting in an undersized head and underdeveloped brain, leading to development issues and premature death.207 The current Zika outbreak is the
largest recorded, and the first to suggest a connection between Zika infection
and microcephaly.208
The response from the Brazilian government has ranged from advising
citizens against becoming pregnant to establishing a task force to eliminate
stagnant water bodies where mosquitoes might breed.209 Management of
surface water resources to limit mosquito breeding during Brazil’s wet season
becomes the nation’s best option, as there are no vaccines or cures for Zika.
The Zika outbreak has the potential to become an international issue as well,
as was evidenced with news coverage of Zika during the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio. The Zika epidemic appears to be following the same epidemiological path as recent outbreaks of a similar mosquito-borne virus,
chikungunya.210 That virus has extended throughout much of Latin
201 Freedman, supra note 200, at 39–41; see also Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons,
The Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665, 683–84
(1989).
202 Johnson et al., supra note 32; see also Darlington, supra note 32.
203 Edward B. Hayes, Zika Virus Outside Africa, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1347,
1347 (2009).
204 Darlington, supra note 32.
205 Id.; Johnson et al., supra note 32.
206 Darlington, supra note 32; Johnson et al., supra note 32.
207 Darlington, supra note 32; Johnson et al., supra note 32; see also Madeline A. Lancaster et al., Cerebral Organoids Model Human Brain Development and Microcephaly, 501 NATURE
373, 373 (2013).
208 Johnson et al., supra note 32.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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America211 and the southwestern United States.212 Water law may ultimately
play the most significant role in containing the disease by facilitating pesticide applications to breeding habitats, limiting development projects that
result in standing water, and regulating the development of irrigation, wetland, sewage, and storage infrastructure. Water law, in pursuing the Red
Agenda, seeks to make communities resilient to these kinds of epidemics,
while still meeting its goals of equitable water apportionment and efficient
water quality protection.
D.

How the Three Agendas of Water Law Interact

The Red, Green, and Blue Agendas of water law interact in a myriad of
ways. The Venn diagram below provides an illustration upon which a discussion of these interactions can be based:
FIGURE 2: VENN DIAGRAM

OF THE

The Red Agenda:
resiliency to water
diseases

D

THREE WATER LAW AGENDAS

The Blue Agenda:
equitable access
to water

A

G
B

F
C

E
The Green Agenda:
efficiently protect
water quality

As illustrated in this diagram, the three agendas of water law interact in
important ways. For example, in Area A of the diagram, all three agendas are
integrated. An example of a water law that integrates all three agendas might
be legal incentives for water efficiency, like irrigation duties or minimum
water efficiencies for appliances. In that case, more water is available for the
environment to protect aquatic habitat and to dilute pollution, thus advancing the Green Agenda. More water is available for domestic, industrial, and
agricultural uses, and for water banking, thus advancing the Blue Agenda.
211 CDC, Chikungunya Virus: Geographic Distribution (May 12, 2016), https://www.cdc
.gov/chikungunya/geo/.
212 CDC, Chikungunya Virus: 2016 Provisional Data for the United States (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/chikungunya/geo/united-states-2016.html.
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And more water is available for hygiene and sanitation, thus preventing
water-washed and waterborne diseases and advancing the Red Agenda.
Area B of the diagram would include ways in which the Red and Green
Agendas reinforce one another. For example, prohibitions against untreated
discharges from wastewater treatment plants to rivers would protect rivers
from nutrient pollution and also limit exposure to diseases resulting from
fecal contamination, thus advancing both the Green and Red Agendas. Area
C is the intersection of the Blue and Green Agendas, which could refer to
improved irrigation techniques that would enhance water available for agriculture under the Blue Agenda while limiting pollution from irrigation runoff under the Green Agenda. Area D is the intersection of the Red and Blue
Agendas, which would include investments in water infrastructure to deliver
treated drinking water to households. This diagram illustrates many ways in
which water law’s three agendas are mutually reinforcing.
Nevertheless, there are areas in which water law’s three agendas may
ignore the aims of the other agendas, or even be implemented in ways that
conflict with those aims. In Area G, for example, the dumping of enormous
concentrations of disinfectants and pesticides into rivers and lakes in the
name of preventing waterborne or water-related diseases might inappropriately prioritize the Red Agenda over the Green. A large rice irrigation project might advance the Blue Agenda in Area F, but bring disease vectors
closer to humans and result in fertilizer and pesticide contamination, thus
frustrating the aims of the Green and Red Agendas.
The ongoing water crisis in Flint, Michigan, can be better understood
through this framework. To address resource restraints associated with water
service, the city of Flint ceased purchasing water from Detroit and instead
shifted its primary water source to the nearby Flint River.213 Lowering water
costs and shifting to a closer source is an example of Blue Agenda thinking.
However, the shift has resulted in a major public health crisis, including a
spike in Legionnaires’ Disease, a waterborne bacterial infection, in Flint.214
Had water planners integrated the Red Agenda into planning, they may have
been more likely to consider the status of the new water source in terms of
the potential for waterborne pathogen outbreaks. Additionally, the Blue
Agenda approach that led to reliance on the Flint River as a drinking water
source arguably failed to adequately integrate the Green Agenda by not considering the corrosive nature of the Flint River water caused by chloride
contamination.215
213 Hannah Rappleye et al., Bad Decisions, Broken Promises: A Timeline of the Flint Water
Crisis, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/bad-decisionsbroken-promises-timeline-flint-water-crisis-n499641.
214 Suzannah Gonzales, Legionnaires’ Spike in Michigan County Dealing with Water Crisis,
REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water-idUSKCN0
UR23120160113.
215 Stephen Rodrick, Who Poisoned Flint, Michigan?, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/who-poisoned-flint-michigan-20160122.
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The crisis in Flint is arguably an example of pure Blue thinking, lodged
in Area F of Figure 2 and failing to adequately integrate the other agendas.
The fundamental importance of the three-agendas framework is to
encourage an integrated approach to the development and implementation
of water law and policy, and avoid or mitigate conflicts between these agendas, like that in Flint. This integrated approach should result in a water policy that efficiently protects water quality (Green), equitably apportions water
quantity (Blue), and enhances resilience to water diseases (Red).
II.

CONFLICTING AGENDAS

IN

WATER LAW

The tripartite aims of water law and policy are thus equity in water distribution and access (the Blue Agenda), efficiency in water quality protection
and remediation (the Green Agenda), and resiliency to diseases classified
under the Bradley Classifications (the Red Agenda). The inherent breadth
and ambiguity of these terms are a double-edged sword, making it both simple and complicated to reconcile these aims depending on how one defines
them. There is nothing inevitably irreconcilable about the aims to promote
equity, efficiency, and resiliency in the development and application of law.
The advancement of the Red Agenda in water law, however, is often incidental to the promotion of the other agendas. Furthermore, the Green and
Blue Agendas are sometimes pursued in water law in ways that ignore, or
even conflict with, the Red Agenda. This Part discusses three ways in which
water law pursues the Green Agenda and the Blue Agenda to the detriment
of the Red Agenda: (A) in the establishment of drinking water quality standards; (B) in the development of water infrastructure; and (C) in the interpretation of the right to water and a clean environment.
A.

Drinking Water Quality Standards Conflicting with the Red Agenda

Drinking water quality standards would appear to be one part of water
law that explicitly advances the Red Agenda. After all, the express purpose of
the SDWA and its primary drinking water standards is the protection of public health.216 As noted above, drinking water standards often directly address
issues such as disinfection, minimum treatment techniques, and maximum
levels of total coliforms.217 Nevertheless, even in the area of water law most
obviously and directly connected to disease prevention, the Red Agenda can
be stifled by the Green Agenda.
For example, drinking water quality standards may establish maximum
levels for disinfectant byproducts (DBPs).218 DBPs are compounds produced
from the reaction of disinfectants (like chlorine or chlorine dioxide) with
216 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)(A) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185 1 (1974); 1 WORLD HEALTH
ORG., GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER QUALITY 1 (3d ed. 2004).
217 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 216, at 5; Keith S. Porter, Fixing Our Drinking
Water: From Field and Forest to Faucet, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 403 (2006).
218 See Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2234.
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organic compounds in water.219 For example, a reservoir may have elevated
organic compounds like leaves and bark, resulting from storm runoff after a
wildfire or bark beetle infestation in the surrounding forest. When that reservoir water is treated with chlorine to kill harmful bacteria, the chlorine will
react with the organic compounds, producing DBPs like trihalomethane or
haloacetic acid.220 Chronic ingestion of elevated levels of DBPs in drinking
water has been demonstrated to increase risk of cancer and neurological
disorders.221
Where maximum chronic DBP standards are applied to drinking water
in developing countries, the result is often prioritization of concerns for
chronic DBP toxicity at the expense of effective treatment of pathogens.222
Countries tend to focus on compliance with DBP standards by reducing treatment with disinfectants.223 This may be a rational tradeoff in some developed countries where the risk of cholera or typhoid is minimal, effective
treatment options are available, and improved sanitation and hygiene practices would limit any outbreak.224 However, the threat posed by microbial
pathogens in developing countries is far greater than the health effects of
chronic elevated DBP concentrations.225 In the case of DBP standards, the
aims of the Green Agenda to efficiently protect water quality at reasonable
costs interfere with improving community resilience to waterborne pathogens like cholera, and thus conflict with the Red Agenda.
Drinking water quality standards fail to integrate the Red Agenda in
other ways as well, and in ways that impact communities in both developed
and developing nations. There is growing pressure on regulators to improve
drinking water quality by addressing possible chemical threats to human
219 Guanghui Hua & David A. Reckhow, Comparison of Disinfection Byproduct Formation
from Chlorine and Alternative Disinfectants, 41 WATER RES. 1667, 1667 (2007).
220 Id.
221 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR POTABLE WATER SUPPLY:
ASSESSING THE NEW YORK CITY STRATEGY 23 (2000); Gary A. Boorman et al., Drinking Water
Disinfection Byproducts: Review and Approach to Toxicity Evaluation, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
207 (1999); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 261, 296 n.132 (2000).
222 Nicholas John Ashbolt, Risk Analysis of Drinking Water Microbial Contamination Versus
Disinfection By-Products (DBPs), 198 TOXICOLOGY 255 (2004); see also Larson, The New Right in
Water, supra note 36, at 2234.
223 Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2234.
224 Id.
225 Id. The World Health Organization has cautioned against universal, one-size-fits-all
quality standards, noting that “[i]t must be emphasized that the guideline values recommended [by the WHO] are not mandatory limits. In order to define such limits, it is
necessary to consider the guideline values in the context of local or national environmental, social, economic, and cultural conditions.” Ashok Gadgil, Drinking Water in Developing
Countries, 23 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 253, 255 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER QUALITY § 1.1 (2d
ed. 1996)). To the extent a positive human right to water is framed as a requirement for
water of “equal” quality across the globe, such a requirement could pose risks to public
health.
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health, such as pharmaceuticals or pesticides.226 This pressure for more
stringent drinking water standards, particularly in developed countries,
results in increased costs to public water systems.227 In some instances, however, more stringent drinking water standards may result in greater risks to
human health. Small drinking water systems cannot achieve economies of
scale, and often have limited bonding capacity, less access to credit and capital, and a smaller customer base.228 Such systems may not be able to afford
more stringent standards aimed at constituent chemicals that are difficult to
detect, much less effectively treat.229
These systems may be forced to allocate scarce resources that could go
toward treatment of microbial pathogens or toward monitoring for chemical
constituents that are expensive to detect and treat. Under the SDWA, small
public water systems that rely on surface water or groundwater under the
direct influence of surface water must only monitor for Cryptosporidium if E.
coli concentrations exceed a certain level.230 For these systems, more stringent standards for chemical constituents may divert resources away from filtration or ultraviolet treatment needed to address Cryptosporidium.231 As
noted above, Cryptosporidium outbreaks are relatively common in the developing world and notoriously difficult and expensive to treat.232 There are
unquestionably health concerns associated with the presence of pharmaceuticals and pesticides in drinking water.233 But the question is whether the risk
associated with monitoring and treating these contaminants is as imminent
226 See, e.g., Gabriel Eckstein, Drugs on Tap: Managing Pharmaceuticals in Our Nation’s
Waters, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 37 (2015); Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal
Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 309 (1999).
227 Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119,
167 (2003); Michael Carney, European Drinking Water Standards, 83 J. AM. WATER WORKS
ASS’N 48 (1991); David L. Markell, The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Regulation:
Shoring up Our Federal System, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 885, 891 n.14 (1993) (citing ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA 230-R-93-007, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES: FIVE CASE STUDIES, FINAL REPORT 11–14 (1993)).
228 Cox, supra note 197, at 154; see also Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97,
208–09 (1996).
229 Cox, supra note 197, at 153; see also Paul Westerhoff et al., Fate of Endocrine-Disruptor,
Pharmaceutical, and Personal Care Product Chemicals During Simulated Drinking Water Treatment
Processes, 39 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6649 (2005).
230 Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,640, 47,665
(proposed Aug. 11, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141, 142); AM. WATER WORKS
ASS’N, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REGULATION 17 (2013), http://www.awwa.org/Portals/0/files/
publications/documents/samples/20428-4e_excerpt.pdf (noting that the new rule permits
small systems to perform initial E. coli monitoring to determine if Cryptosporidium monitoring is necessary).
231 J. Alan Roberson, From Common Cup to Cryptosporidium: A Regulatory Evolution, 98 AM.
WATER WORKS ASS’N 198, 204 (2006).
232 Michael F. Craun et al., Waterborne Outbreaks Reported in the United States, 4 J. WATER &
HEALTH 19 (2006).
233 See Eckstein, supra note 226; see also Sachs, supra note 226.
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and serious to a given community as the threat of a waterborne disease outbreak like Cryptosporidium, and how systems evaluating these risks should allocate costs to mitigate them.
Similar issues arise in another aspect of the Green Agenda, though this
applies to intentional criminal contamination of drinking water supplies
rather than the more typical conception of pollution. Increased costs have
been imposed on small systems in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.234 In an effort to protect drinking water systems from terrorist
attacks, the SDWA was amended to require all community water systems (i.e.,
those systems serving at least fifteen service connections or twenty-five people
year-round)235 to conduct vulnerability assessments to chemical or biological
attacks and prepare emergency response plans.236 The costs associated with
these assessments and emergency plans can be significant, particularly for
smaller systems with already limited resources.
Increased regulatory compliance costs cannot be easily addressed by
increasing rates, either, because these systems are typically regulated public
utilities with a state agency setting their rates.237 As such, small drinking
water systems may be forced to expend limited resources on the prevention
of, and response to, terrorist attacks rather than improved monitoring, filtration, and ultraviolet treatment for Cryptosporidium. A terrorist attack on any
community’s drinking water system would be catastrophic, and systems are
well-advised to invest in the prevention of, and response to, such attacks.
However, appropriate consideration of the Red Agenda would facilitate better assessment of the risks terrorism poses to a system as compared to
Cryptosporidium.
However, integration of the Red Agenda alongside the Green Agenda
would require an evaluation of the resiliency of the community to pathogens
of concern, regardless of system size, in addition to the cost-benefit analysis
associated with the application of more stringent standards for potentially
toxic chemicals like biological or chemical weapons or pharmaceuticals or
pesticides. Under the current approach, many small public water systems are
forced to prioritize addressing toxic chemical constituents without knowing
for certain whether microbial pathogens pose a greater threat to their consumers. Proper consideration of the Red Agenda would compel an evaluation of the relative risks posed to a given community and how best to allocate
scarce resources to address these risks.

234 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(1) (2012). See generally Steven D. Shermer, The Drinking Water
Security and Safety Amendments of 2002: Is America’s Drinking Water Infrastructure Safer Four
Years Later?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355 (2006).
235 42 U.S.C. § 300f(15).
236 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(1); see also AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N, PROTECTING OUR WATER:
DRINKING WATER SECURITY IN AMERICA AFTER 9/11 (2003), http://www.awwa.org/publica
tions/journal-awwa/abstract/articleid/14839.aspx.
237 Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2221–22.
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Water Infrastructure Development Conflicting with the Red Agenda

Despite these conflicts between the Green and Red Agendas, there are
ways—like fecal coliform standards—in which these two agendas reinforce
each other. The Blue Agenda—the pursuit of equitable allocation of, and
access to, water resources—can also reinforce the Red Agenda. The essential
lesson from Drawers of Water is that simply providing adequate water quantity
for hygiene purposes can have dramatic effects for the prevention of waterwashed diseases, like scabies or trachoma.238 Nevertheless, some efforts to
improve access to water and equitably allocate water resources can aggravate
public health issues related to microbial pathogens.239 As with the Green
Agenda and its emphasis on DBPs, the Blue Agenda can at times conflict with
the Red Agenda.
The construction of reservoirs, man-made wetlands, irrigation systems,
rice fields, and other infrastructure or built habitats could advance access to
water and promote the Blue Agenda.240 Indeed, there is pressing need
throughout the world for increased investment in water infrastructure.241
The need for increased investment in water infrastructure has led to increasing funds available from international development banks, non-governmental organizations, international development agencies, and incentives for
private lenders and investors to support water projects like dams, water treatment plants, and irrigation systems.242
But these water projects could also frustrate the Red Agenda by bringing
disease vector habitats closer to human communities.243 This conflict results
from a combination of factors that would be better addressed with improved
integration of the Red Agenda in water law. These factors include deforestation and replacement of forest with irrigated agriculture or with cattle graz238 WHITE ET AL., supra note 144; see also Mara & Feachem, supra note 145, at 334.
239 David Bradley, Institutional Capacity to Monitor the Interactions of Agricultural and
Health Change, in AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 327 (Vernon W. Ruttan ed., 1994).
240 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple
Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 410 n.37 (1994); Margaret J. Vick, The Senegal
River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective Look at the Legal Régime, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 211,
223 (2006).
241 David Grey & Claudia W. Sadoff, Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and Development, 9 WATER POL’Y 545 (2007).
242 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 68 (2010); Craig, supra note 85,
at 910–11; Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries Via Private
Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 92–95 (1995).
243 See generally Jonathan A. Patz et al., Unhealthy Landscapes: Policy Recommendations on
Land Use Change and Infectious Disease Emergence, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1092, 1092
(2004) (prescribing certain reforms in land use planning to prevent infectious disease outbreaks associated with agricultural development, deforestation, and population increases
and shifts); see also Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Adiós to Paradise: The Yacyretá Dam and the Destruction
of Environmental and Human Rights, 7 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 181, 206–07 (2012).
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ing requiring stock ponds for watering.244 When replacement of forests with
agriculture is combined with rising temperatures associated with global climate change, the conditions necessary for tropical disease vectors, like mosquitoes, to thrive and expand intersect with human communities.245
The example of the development of the Diama Dam is illustrative of the
potential conflict between the Blue and Red Agendas in water law and policy.246 In 1987, the first of a series of dams was completed on a tributary of
the Senegal River in Mali, and the total project created a reservoir storage
capacity of 11.3 billion cubic meters of water for irrigation, hydroelectric
power, flood control, and human domestic and industrial uses.247 The $150million project, partially financed by the African Development Bank, was
motivated in part by objectives to develop irrigated farming by controlling
water resources and to regulate the navigability of rivers between Mali and
Senegal.248
The dam allowed expansion of irrigation infrastructure, including in
particular flood rice irrigation.249 Although one of the stated objectives was
to make the river navigable year-round,250 implementation came at the cost
of downstream farming251 that had existed for centuries in the region.
Within a year after the dam’s completion, communities living near new irrigation projects in Senegal suffered a significant increase in waterborne,
water-related, and water-based infections.252 These included cholera
epidemics and increased incidence of malaria.253 Most significant, however,
was a dramatic increase in schistosomiasis. Studies in 1988 and 1989 showed
244 WILLIAM JOBIN, DAMS AND DISEASE: ECOLOGICAL DESIGN AND HEALTH IMPACTS OF
LARGE DAMS, CANALS AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 21 (1999); see also Patricia L. Farnese, Searching for Wildlife: A Critique of Canada’s Regulatory Response to Emerging Zoonotic Diseases, 39
QUEEN’S L.J. 471, 477–78 (2014).
245 Farnese, supra note 244, at 477–78.
246 Vick, supra note 240, at 215–18.
247 Id. at 216; see also S. Sow et al., Water-Related Disease Patterns Before and After the Construction of the Diama Dam in Northern Senegal, 96 ANNALS OF TROPICAL MED. & PARASITOLOGY
575 (2002).
248 AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., SENEGAL/MALI/MAURITANIA DIAMA DAM PROJECT: PROJECT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT (PPER) 1–8 (1988), http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/
uploads/afdb/Documents/Evaluation-Reports-_Shared-With-OPEV_/06004235-EN-MULTINATIONAL-DIAMA-DAM-PROJECT.pdf; David G. LeMarquand, International Development of the Senegal River, 15 WATER INT’L 223, 225 (1990).
249 See Jennifer Keiser et al., Effect of Irrigation and Large Dams on the Burden of Malaria on
a Global and Regional Scale, 72 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 392, 394 (2005).
250 ANDRE DEGEORGES & B.K. REILLY, DAMS AND LARGE SCALE IRRIGATION ON THE SENEGAL RIVER: IMPACTS ON MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (2006), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/
default/files/degeorges_andre.pdf.
251 Id. at 10.
252 Id. at 18; Keiser et al., supra note 249, at 401; V.R. Southgate, Schistosomiasis in the
Senegal River Basin: Before and After the Construction of the Dams at Diama, Senegal and
Manantali, Mali and Future Prospects, 71 J. HELMINTHOLOGY 125, 128 (1997). But see Sow et
al., supra note 247, at 579–83.
253 See Keiser et al., supra note 249, at 398.
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that sixty percent of the people living within the vicinity of the Diama Dam
had intestinal schistosomiasis.254
In the case of the Diama Dam, legal rights to water for irrigation, international legal obligations to maintain navigability on an international river,
and incentives created by international development bank loan programs
facilitated the development of a large dam and irrigation project that ultimately advanced the Blue Agenda (greater access to water). However, in the
case of the Diama Dam, the Blue Agenda significantly conflicted with the
aims of the Red Agenda by expanding disease vector habitat in rice fields,
increasing human interaction with disease vectors by making wading possible
year-round, and bringing drinking water sources closer to human habitation
without corresponding improvements in sanitation, increasing the likelihood
of fecal contamination. Integration of the Red Agenda in water project
financing, water rights, international navigation treaties, and water treatment
requirements could have harmonized the two aims of the two agendas.
The conflict between the Blue and Red Agendas is not unique to the
Diama Dam case or to developing countries in general. The increased incidence of West Nile virus in the United States has been linked to the development of large dam projects, and particularly, the connection between large
dams and irrigation in warm-weather environments.255 In the arid western
United States, large dams and irrigation systems, often funded and managed
by federal agencies, are critical to satisfying prior appropriation water rights
and managing the equitable apportionment of interstate rivers.256
Dams and irrigation infrastructure, furthermore, are not the only water
projects that implicate a conflict between the Blue and Red Agendas. In Arizona, for example, regulations encourage, and in some cases effectively
require, artificial groundwater recharge in order to avoid unsustainable
groundwater pumping, called overdraft.257 Artificial groundwater recharge
typically involves large, standing surface water impoundments, sometimes of
river water and sometimes of treated sewage effluent, which then percolate
into the underlying aquifer.258 It is possible that the development of artificial groundwater recharge facilities, aimed at advancing the Blue Agenda,
could frustrate the Red Agenda in ways similar to that of large irrigation
projects or dams. Dams, irrigation systems, groundwater recharge, and water
distribution projects promote inter-generational and intra-generational equi254 See M. Picquet et al., The Epidemiology of Human Schistosomiasis in the Senegal River
Basin, 90 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 340, 340–41 (1996).
255 William Reisen et al., West Nile Virus in California, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
1369, 1369 (2004).
256 Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority Under
Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 251.
257 Paula K. Smith, Coercion and Groundwater Management: Three Case Studies and a “Market” Approach, 16 ENVTL. L. 797, 862–69 (1986).
258 Chris Avery et al., Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences: The Central Arizona
Groundwater Replenishment District, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 347–48 (2007).
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table water allocation under the Blue Agenda, but may erode or limit resiliency to water-related epidemics under the Red Agenda.
C.

Human Right to Water Conflicting with the Red Agenda

One way in which water law seeks to advance both the Blue and Green
Agendas is through human rights. As noted above, there are increasing calls
for the recognition of a human right to water, including in a recent UN
Human Rights Commission Comment and in the codification of such rights
in national constitutions.259 The human right to water can be interpreted as
requiring a country to provide a minimum amount of water at a minimum
quality, at a maximum price and maximum distance from the point of use.260
However, guaranteeing water access within a reasonable proximity of the
point of use could require bringing water sources closer to human habitation. As such, complying with the human right to water could result in
greater intersection of human communities and disease vector habitats, and
increased interaction between human waste and drinking water sources. The
Blue Agenda component of the human right to water thus could interfere
with the Red Agenda in much the same way as the incentives for water infrastructure developing discussed above.
The Green Agenda component of human rights may similarly interfere
with the Red Agenda. As with growing calls for the recognition of a human
right to water, there are also increasing calls for recognizing a human right to
a clean environment.261 Such a human right would place an affirmative obligation on states to protect the environment from contamination at a certain
level and require remediation of pollution exceeding that level.262 Preventing water pollution and facilitating remediation of water contamination have
potential benefits to human health as well as to environmental protection.
Toxic chemicals and elevated heavy metals in drinking water have serious
detrimental effects on humans.263 Pollution of aquatic ecosystems results in
destruction of habitat, loss of biodiversity, and contamination of water
259 See, e.g., Keith H. Hirokawa, Property as Capture and Care, 74 ALB. L. REV. 175, 230
(2010); Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2187.
260 Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 957, 983–85 (2004); Ramin Pejan, Note, The Right to Water: The Road to Justiciability, 36
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1181, 1188 (2004).
261 See Michael Burger, Bi-Polar and Polycentric Approaches to Human Rights and the Environment, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371, 381 (2003); Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71,
129–30 (2005).
262 See Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
65, 90–91 (2002); Linda A. Malone & Scott Pasternack, Exercising Environmental Human
Rights and Remedies in the United Nations System, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 365
(2003).
263 See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 n.16 (1993);
Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1742 n.439 (2004).
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resources with inherent aesthetic, recreational, cultural, and ecosystem service values.264 Laws aimed at preventing these harms, including the standards and permit schemes associated with the Green Agenda, play an
important role in protecting and promoting healthy ecosystems and human
communities.265
Nevertheless, as with the example of the regulation of DBP concentrations, pollution prevention regulation can be implemented in a way that
interferes with equally important human health considerations. In National
Cotton Council v. EPA, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a federal rule that exempted pesticide application to surface waters from CWA
permitting requirements.266 The EPA had promulgated a rule in 2006 to
exempt pesticide applications from CWA permitting requirements when
such application was conducted in accordance with the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).267 The rule was an outgrowth of
previous cases that held that CWA permitting requirements applied to pesticide discharges to jurisdictional waters.268 In the wake of these earlier decisions, many states moved to establish general permits for pesticide
discharges, in part to prevent individual permitting requirements from delaying response to outbreaks of West Nile virus.269 General permits are issued
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements and apply to a
broad category of discharges, with individual discharges filing a “Notice of
Intent” (NOI) to discharge pursuant to those permits, and thus avoid the
costs and delays associated with individual permits.270 The EPA declined to
pursue a general permit approach, and instead promulgated the rule
exempting such discharges from CWA permitting requirements, under the
theory that these discharges were not “pollutants” as defined under the CWA
because they were chemical “products” and not chemical “wastes.”271
The Sixth Circuit rejected the EPA’s rationale and struck down the rule
as inconsistent with the CWA.272 The court held that residual pesticides in
264 Avi Brisman, Double Whammy: Collateral Consequences of Conviction and Imprisonment for
Sustainable Communities and the Environment, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 423,
450 (2004) (quoting BETH E. LACHMAN, LINKING SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES TO
POLLUTION PREVENTION: A SOURCEBOOK 6–7 (1997)); James Gathii & Keith H. Hirokawa,
Curtailing Ecosystem Exportation: Ecosystem Services as a Basis to Reconsider Export-Driven Agriculture in Economies Highly Dependent on Agricultural Exports, 30 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 16–17 (2012).
265 Patricia Ross McCubbin, The Risk in Technology-Based Standards, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 1, 4–5 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry
into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1797 (1992).
266 Nat’l Cotton Council v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009).
267 Id. at 929.
268 Id. at 930–31; see also League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
269 Kevin J. Beaton, Clean Water Act Permitting Requirements for Pesticide Applications in
Idaho, 52 ADVOCATE 15, 16 (2009).
270 See Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 930.
271 Id. at 934–35; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(h) (2009).
272 Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 940.
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the water constituted a “waste” for purposes of the definition of a CWA pollutant, and that other pesticides that relied on bacteria, fungi, or viruses were
clearly “biological materials” and thus pollutants under the CWA.273 In
response to the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the EPA ultimately pursued the same
course that state permitting agencies had taken in response to previous court
decisions, and issued a Pesticide General Permit to regulate discharges of
pesticides to jurisdictional waters.274 Nevertheless, despite the cost savings as
compared to an individual permit process, general permits still require the
submittal of an NOI and other related compliance costs, potentially including the preparation of a pollution prevention plan, internal compliance
audits, and employee training.275
The compliance costs associated with permitting pesticide discharges to
prevent water pollution are a prime example of the conflict between the
Green and Red Agendas in the context of human rights. In an effort to
protect the environment from water pollution, water law imposes costs that
could interfere with an expeditious response to water-related disease outbreak. The human right to a clean environment may ultimately protect
human communities from toxins or carcinogens, but at the expense of protecting the same community from pathogens and vectors. Achieving efficient
protection of the environment under the Green Agenda with a relatively
inexpensive general permit may nevertheless prevent adequate resiliency to
epidemics under the Red Agenda.
The apparent conflict between these two legitimate aims is reminiscent
of the controversy surrounding dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, or DDT.276
DDT is particularly effective in preventing water-related disease outbreaks, as
it is one of the best chemicals for controlling mosquito populations.277 However, the dangerous side effects of DDT use on human health were cataloged
in Rachel Carson’s seminal book Silent Spring.278 This led to a ban on the use
of DDT in many countries, and ultimately an international ban on the use of
DDT under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.279
273 See id. at 937–38.
274 Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide General
Permit for Point Source Discharges from the Application of Pesticides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,750
(Nov. 7, 2011).
275 See generally Steven G. Davison, General Permits Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,
26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 35 (2009).
276 See generally D.R. Roberts et al., A Probability Model of Vector Behavior: Effects of DDT
Repellency, Irritancy, and Toxicity in Malaria Control, 25 J. VECTOR ECOLOGY 48 (2000).
277 See Amir Attaran & Rajendra Maharaj, DDT for Malaria Control Should Not Be Banned,
321 BRITISH MED. J. 1403, 1403 (2000); Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property
Rights, Pesticides, & Public Health: Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 28–32 (2002).
278 See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
279 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), May 22, 2001, 40
I.L.M. 1531; see also Julie B. Truelsen, Comment, Developments in Toxics in 2004: The Ratification of the Stockholm Convention and the Rotterdam Convention, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 217, 218–19 (2005).
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Yet the ban on DDT has resulted in a dramatic increase in the incidence of
malaria worldwide.280 In 1952, the WHO estimated the global number of
people infected by malaria to be around 350 million people.281 By 1969, that
number had fallen by ninety-seven percent, largely as a result of DDT.282
The risk of malaria doubled in Colombia and Peru when DDT application
ceased in the 1990s.283 In Sri Lanka, malaria infections fell from 2.8 million
per year to seventeen after application of DDT.284 When DDT application
ceased in Sri Lanka, malaria infections rose to 500,000 per year by 1969.285
This is not to say that the damage potentially caused by DDT does not
outweigh the harms of the malaria it prevents, nor does this mean that there
are not options for malaria control that are equal to or better than DDT, but
with fewer costs and risks.286 But it illustrates the role of the precautionary
principle in environmental law and policy and its place within the human
rights approach under the Green Agenda. The precautionary principle has
growing influence in international and domestic environmental law and policy, and states that governments should not wait for scientific certainty before
intervening to prevent any harm that could be serious or irreversible.287 The
precautionary principle has been invoked as part of the human right to a
clean environment.288 But this principle, in cases involving pesticide application, can simply be begging the question—cautious of what? Taking precautions to prevent environmental and human health impacts from DDT
applications involved risks associated with increasing incidence of malaria
and, in some cases, the rise of drug-resistant strains of malaria as nations
shifted from vector control using DDT to treatment with anti-malarial
drugs.289 The Green Agenda’s application of the precautionary principle
was certainly cautious within the context of environmental toxins, but it perhaps failed to integrate the risks associated with the Red Agenda.
The examples of pesticide and DBP regulation illustrate why distinguishing between the Green and Red Agendas is helpful. At first, these two agendas can appear identical, if not largely overlapping. After all, protecting the
280 See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 277, at 28–32.
281 Id. at 30.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 31.
284 Id.; see D.R. Roberts et al., DDT House Spraying and Re-Emerging Malaria, 356 LANCET
330, 331 (2000).
285 Morriss & Meiners, supra note 277, at 31; see Roberts et al., supra note 284, at 331.
286 Morriss & Meiners, supra note 277, at 33–37.
287 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 18
(2005); Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1285, 1288.
288 See Menno T. Kamminga, The Precautionary Approach in International Human Rights
Law: How It Can Benefit the Environment, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 171–86 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey
eds., 1996); Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the Precautionary Principle? An American Assessment from an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 582 (2006).
289 See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 277, at 28–40.
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environment from water pollution and preventing harmful chemicals in
drinking water seems completely consistent with protecting human health.
And these agendas certainly may be pursued in ways that are consistent in
their approach and mutually reinforcing. However, the cases of DBP regulation and pesticide permitting suggest that focusing excessively on pollution
and chemicals (the heart of the Green Agenda) can sometimes exclude effective consideration of pathogens and vectors (the heart of the Red Agenda).
III.

INTEGRATING

THE

RED AGENDA

INTO

WATER LAW

While the examples provided above note the myriad ways in which the
predominant Blue and Green Agendas of water law conflict with the Red
Agenda, such conflicts are not inevitable or ubiquitous. Indeed, as already
noted, there are important ways in which these agendas already function in
harmony and are mutually reinforcing, such as the Blue Agenda’s focus on
water provision facilitating improved hygiene, and the Green Agenda’s drinking water standards relating to fecal coliforms. Indeed, one lesson from the
Drawers of Water study is the importance of water access—even to less-thanclean water—in promoting improved hygiene and sanitation. While conflicts
between agendas occur, water law is not necessarily characterized generally
by such conflicts and these agendas overlap in important ways. Even the conflicts discussed above between these agendas can be avoided or mitigated by
making reforms to water law.
This Part proposes three broad categories of legal reforms to avoid or
mitigate conflicts between the Green and Blue Agendas and the Red Agenda:
(A) increase the role of local stakeholders in the development of drinking
water standards; (B) integrate pathogen and disease vector habitat considerations into environmental assessments conducted by governments and development banks; and (C) reinterpret the human rights to water and a clean
environment to account for disease prevention, including an adaptive
approach that allows for emergency response to epidemics associated with
water resources.
A.

Why the Colors Conflict

The examples discussed above provide some evidence that the pursuit of
the Blue and Green Agendas in water law and policy can interfere in varying
degrees with the pursuit of the Red Agenda. But these examples leave open
the question of the cause of such conflicts. As already noted above, such
conflicts are not inevitable and each of these agendas can be, and often are,
pursued in ways that are mutually reinforcing. What then causes these agendas to sometimes clash? Silo thinking and attenuated decisionmaking are
two possible explanations.
The silo effect afflicts large departments or divisions of larger organizations, where the individual department develops its own “bureaucratic imperatives” that create obstacles to effective information sharing and
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cooperation.290 For example, the Department of Homeland Security was
created in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, as a response
to silo thinking in intelligence agencies that arguably precluded information
sharing related to the terrorist threat between the National Security Agency
(NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).291 The NSA focuses on signals intelligence, the CIA on
foreign human espionage, and the FBI on domestic criminal intelligence.
Arguably, these separate silos and distinct imperatives prevented effective
coordination in counter-terrorism.292
A large organization—like a national government or the World Bank—
may broadly desire to protect the environment and human health while equitably allocating water resources. But individual agencies or departments
within those organizations tasked with distinct agendas pursue those agendas
within their individual silos. Effectively, the silo effect “reflects the divergence of interests and incentives between a large organization (the principal)
and a particular department or division within it (the agent).”293 Furthermore, the distinct competencies and bureaucracies of each agent create
transaction costs in integrating process, jargon, and disciplinary expertise
that may frustrate efforts at coordination.294
So the U.S. government may desire to simultaneously pursue all three
water policy agendas, but the EPA focuses on the prevention of pollution and
the treatment of drinking water, while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or
Bureau of Reclamation focuses on water infrastructure development and
management, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
concentrates on the prevention of, and response to, disease outbreaks. Each
has distinct processes for the development and implementation of policy,
and each has different competencies, such that communication and coordination requires overcoming differences in expertise and operation. Additionally, each has different incentives, as one agency primarily responsible for
advancing one agenda would receive little reward for advancing other agendas, particularly at the expense of its own. This silo thinking impedes interagency coordination for purposes of water policy in the same way it did for
the intelligence community.
In addition to silo thinking, attenuated decisionmaking also partially
explains the reason water law agendas sometimes clash. Attenuated decisionmaking occurs when policy is made at a jurisdictional level remote from the
290 Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV.
499, 511 (2011).
291 Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1016
n.224 (2014); Levy & Glicksman, supra note 290, at 511.
292 See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 622–23 (2007); Fairfield & Luna, supra
note 291, at 1016 n.224.
293 Levy & Glicksman, supra note 290, at 512.
294 Id. at 513.
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implementation level.295 Organizations like the EPA, WHO, or World Bank
may be attenuated from the geographic, sociocultural, or economic reality of
the areas where their water policy is ultimately implemented. Thus, the concerns of the developed world with respect to water—carcinogens, pesticides,
pharmaceuticals, recreation—reflected in some agency decisionmaking may
take precedence over the greater concerns associated with the Red Agenda
in the communities where water policy is implemented.
B.

Localized Water Governance

Water policy as advanced under any of the three agendas is frequently a
question of devolving regulatory authority to a more localized level. In other
words, integrating the three agendas requires reform that overcomes attenuated decisionmaking and promotes familiarity amongst water policymakers of
the epidemiological realities of the regions where policy is implemented. For
purposes of advancing water policy’s agendas, the world is like a golf ball—a
sphere pocked with divots.296 Each divot is a catchment or river basin into
which all water drains, and the boundaries between divots are called watersheds.297 Under what is called the “internalization prescription for government
jurisdiction,” authority to govern natural resources like water that spill over
jurisdictional boundaries should be assigned “to the smallest unit of government
that internalizes the effects of its exercise.”298 This prescription prevents jurisdictions from externalizing costs associated with such spillover goods, like damming or polluting a river and thereby adversely impacting a downstream
neighbor.299 In the case of water, jurisdictional boundaries should correspond to water’s geographic contours—i.e., its watershed and sub-basins.300
To satisfy the internalization prescription, “[w]hen the effects of a public
good or bad spill over jurisdictions, a special district should provide the good or control
the bad.”301 Such localized districts facilitate greater familiarity with the
unique sociocultural, hydrological, climatological, economic, and epidemiological conditions of the resource.302
The WHO drinking water standards and the EPA’s MCLs can fail to
properly account for local conditions, because standard-setting agencies have
an attenuated relationship with the water and its unique local and regional
295 See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the
European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807, 812 (2005).
296 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 36, at 911.
297 Id.
298 ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 107 (2000).
299 Id. at 105–07.
300 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 36, at 912.
301 COOTER, supra note 298, at 106.
302 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 36, at 911–12; see also J.B. Ruhl & Harold J.
Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal
the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 405, 471–72 (1997) (discussing the effects of decentralization on complex
social structures, not unlike the localized districts and their relation to water law).
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conditions, including organic material in source water and the relative risks
posed to a population from DBP concentrations or microbial pathogens.
The SDWA has a structure that facilitates some degree of localized control
over drinking water standards.303 The EPA can grant primacy to state agencies under the SDWA to establish standards, with the EPA retaining oversight
authority.304 Furthermore, public water systems can petition agencies implementing the SDWA for a variance from applicable MCLs if localized conditions make MCL compliance infeasible.305
Nevertheless, states with SDWA primacy typically adopt the EPA’s
MCLs.306 Even oversight from a state agency may fail to appropriately comply with the internalization prescription, because the jurisdictional boundary
is still often broader than the applicable watershed boundaries, or else the
watershed cross-state jurisdictional boundaries.307 WHO standards, MCLs, or
other “one size fits all” drinking water quality requirements may focus on
addressing chronic DBP standards while risking inadequate disinfection for
pathogens.308 To more fully integrate the Red Agenda into water law, drinking water standards could be developed through a negotiated rulemaking
process involving input from local stakeholders at the sub-basin level.
For drinking water treatment projects in developing countries, standards
could prioritize disinfection at early stages, with a focus on treatment for
heavy metals and toxins, phased in over a period of years as waterborne infections are reduced. Such stakeholder groups will require support from technical experts, which should be factored into budgets associated with loans from
development banks. Localized participation in the development and implementation of drinking water standards does not require less technical or scientific competency, but is intended to ensure that scientists, technicians,
financiers, developers, and policymakers are sensitive to the concerns and
priorities of the communities where water projects are implemented. With
exceptions to unlawful or otherwise negligent operation of treatment systems, water project financing, construction, and operation in the developing
world could be shielded from liability associated with the presence of harmful chemicals in drinking water where that presence is attributable to the
prioritization of disinfection over treatment of potentially harmful chemicals
like DBPs, pesticides, or pharmaceuticals. Such a liability shield may avoid
disincentives to investment in the control of waterborne infections and
appropriately focus initial resources on disinfection of drinking water.
In the United States, a similar negotiated rulemaking process could
apply to the development and implementation of MCLs. This process could
303 See generally James W. Moeller, Legal Issues Associated with Safe Drinking Water in Washington, D.C., 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 661 (2007).
304 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (2012).
305 See, e.g., id. § 300g-4(e); 40 C.F.R. § 142.10 (2015).
306 Inessa Abayev, Note, Hydraulic Fracturing Wastewater: Making the Case for Treating the
Environmentally Condemned, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 297 (2013).
307 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 36, at 911.
308 Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2243.
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be overseen by state agencies with SDWA primacy. Local stakeholder groups
could also establish drinking water standards for non-public water systems
that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SDWA. As a part of their application for Certificates of Convenience and Necessity (effectively, the granting
of a monopoly over a certain area to a public utility by the state),309 public
water systems could pay into a trust administered by the state agency with
SDWA primacy. The amount paid into the trust would be determined by the
size of the customer base of the public water system, and would create funds
to support smaller drinking water systems to conduct source water assessments for Cryptosporidium and invest in filtration or ultra-violet treatment
where necessary. Local stakeholder groups, adequately supported by
resources from state and federal funds, should receive deference from EPA
oversight and courts when reasonably prioritizing disinfection over investments in treatment for pharmaceuticals or other potentially harmful chemicals. This localized approach to the development of drinking water quality
standards and treatment requirements would ideally integrate the Green
Agenda’s concern with the efficient prevention and mitigation of water contamination with the Red Agenda’s concern for community resilience to
infection.
C.

Pathogen and Vector Assessments in Water Development

A more localized approach to water governance may help overcome
attenuated decisionmaking and thereby integrate the Red Agenda more
effectively into water policy. However, additional reforms are necessary to
overcome silo thinking. For example, ex ante water project assessments
should require coordination between agencies tasked with promoting each
agenda. In environmental impact assessments made under the Espoo Treaty,
NEPA, and similar programs, state-funded or state-conducted water projects
should be required to consider disease vector habitat issues as part of project
assessment. Currently, while disease vector issues may be considered in these
assessments, no such consideration is explicitly required in either Espoo or
NEPA.310 Such treaties and statutes could be amended to explicitly require
the impact statement to address disease vectors, including the evaluation of
project alternatives to mitigate possible intersection between expanded or
enhanced disease vector habitat and human communities. There is growing
scholarship and increasing movement in policy implementation of Health
309 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, 49 HARV. L. REV. 163, 165 (1935) (reviewing I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1935)); see also Emily Rogers
& Jasmine Grant, Water Utilities, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 419, 419–21 (2015).
310 See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012) (note there is no
explicit requirement to address disease vectors under NEPA); Espoo Convention, supra
note 96 (note there is no explicit requirement to address disease vectors in environmental
impact assessments conducted under the Espoo Treaty); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Transfrontier Environmental Damage, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 12, 25 (1990) (reporting the
remarks of Ken Murphy and Nicholas A. Robinson, noting that disease vector issues may be
considered in environmental impact assessments).
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Impact Assessments (HIAs) as a companion to environmental impact assessments to ensure adequate consideration of public health.311
Environment impact assessment requirements, like those of NEPA, have
been criticized as toothless procedural hoops with little to no impact on substantive outcomes and improved environmental protection.312 Nevertheless,
these largely procedural statutes can improve project planning by at least
requiring consideration of certain concerns and by imposing a transparency
requirement on such consideration through a public release of the assessment report.313 Furthermore, these statutes can have substantive components in the sense that agencies and companies may agree to enforceable
obligations under memoranda of understanding incorporated into the
record of decision as part of the assessment process.314 An explicit requirement to consider microbial pathogens may have at least alerted the UN to
the possible need to screen aid workers for cholera without having to impose
liability on humanitarian efforts. The focus in water law on the Green and
Blue Agendas may result in water projects moving forward without sufficient
consideration being given to diseases under the Bradley Classification. An
improved environmental impact statement process would impose an obligation to at least evaluate the potential for water projects to impede advancing
the Red Agenda. An express requirement in NEPA for the coordinated
efforts of the EPA, CDC, and water resource development agencies would
mitigate the impacts of silo thinking in water policy development and
implementation.
One of the ways in which environmental impact assessments could evaluate the concerns of the Red Agenda is by addressing how water projects
might result in the loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). DALY is a
measure of the burden of a disease, expressed in terms of the number of
years of life lost due to poor health, disability, or premature death.315 The
WHO relies on DALYs to make decisions on the allocation of resources for
311 See, e.g., EUROPEAN CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY, HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT: MAIN
CONCEPTS AND SUGGESTED APPROACH, GOTHENBURG CONSENSUS PAPER (1999), http://www
.apho.org.uk/resource/item.aspx?RID=44163; Andrew L. Dannenberg et al., Growing the
Field of Health Impact Assessment in the United States: An Agenda for Research and Practice, 96 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 262 (2006).
312 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 339–43
(2004); Veronika Tomoszkova, Implementation of the EU Directive on Environmental Impact
Assessment in the Czech Republic: How Long Can the Wolf Be Tricked?, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY,
CLIMATE & ENV’T 451, 495 (2015).
313 See, e.g., Michael LeVine et al., What About BOEM? The Need to Reform the Regulations
Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning and Leasing, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 231, 245 n.74 (2014).
314 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1164 n.155 (2012); Mason Baker, Note, What Does It Mean to Comply with
NEPA?: An Investigation into Whether NEPA Should Have Procedural or Substantive Force, 31
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 246–47 (2011).
315 See generally Sudhir Anand & Kara Hanson, Disability-Adjusted Life Years: A Critical
Review, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 685 (1997).
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disease prevention.316 Risk assessments made for water projects could be
required to evaluate the potential health impacts from diseases under Bradley Classifications in terms of DALYs, and subject those evaluations to public
scrutiny in a public notice-and-comment process. While DALY has its limits
as a measurement of disease impact, an explicit requirement to model, measure, and evaluate health impacts in a widely accepted and relatively holistic
metric would promote improved evaluation of issues central to the Red
Agenda in environmental impact assessments.317
Environmental impact statements are not the only way in which water
law could be reformed to require government agencies to more fully consider issues under the Red Agenda. For example, under prior appropriation
regimes, applications for changes in diversion points on a stream, new appropriative rights, or to transfer water rights typically require approval from a
state agency.318 State agencies may decline such applications for a number
of reasons, including when such changes or transfers would be against the
public welfare or a menace to public safety.319 State agencies in such
instances could use their authority to deny applications wherever changes in
diversion points, new appropriative rights, or transfers of water rights might
significantly enhance disease vector habitat, or substantially increase the
likely intersection between disease vector habitat and human communities,
or else human waste and drinking water sources. Such an approach would
integrate the concerns of the Red Agenda with the Blue Agenda’s focus on
the equitable apportionment of water resources between individuals, communities, and generations. State water rights agencies should have an
explicit requirement to coordinate with state health agencies with relevant
expertise in waterborne and water-related diseases to ensure that water rights
transfers and changes in diversion points do not increase the risk of disease
outbreaks.
An additional possible reform would be to create the water policy version of the Department of Homeland Security at the national level, and
establish a system that integrates different water policy silos so that each
water policy agenda is adequately considered. Water policy agents in the
EPA, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Centers for
Disease Control could have formalized inter-agency communication and collaboration in water resource assessments. This integrated approach could be
mirrored at the local level, with health, natural resource, and environmental
agencies collaborating in water project assessments under a rigorous, participatory, and integrated HIA process.
316 I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 287 (2013).
317 See Anand & Hanson, supra note 315, at 699.
318 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (2016); Norman K. Johnson & Charles T.
DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and
Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 357–58 (1989); Jesse Reiblich & Christine
A. Klein, Climate Change and Water Transfers, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 439, 458 nn.139–40 (2014).
319 Johnson & DuMars, supra note 318, at 358.
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Reinterpreting Rights to Account for the Red Agenda

Both silo thinking and attenuated decisionmaking are symptomatic of
the reliance on human rights to advance water policy. Advocates pursuing
both the Blue and Green Agendas have relied on human rights to advance
equitable water apportionment and efficient water protection.320 Although
an international human right to water currently is of questionable efficacy
and enforceability, the rhetoric of human rights raises the “lexical priority” of
water issues at the international level.321 Furthermore, domestic constitutional law has made advances in recent years in integrating express rights to
water within an enforceable human rights framework.322 Yet, as noted
above, the human rights approach to the Blue and Green Agendas can be
implemented in ways that interfere with the Red Agenda, including by
preventing expeditious response to outbreaks through anti-vector pesticide
application. These conflicts may arise in part when human rights organizations suffer from silo effects without proper coordination with health organizations, and when human rights advocates unfamiliar with local health
concerns thereby improperly prioritize water access over disease prevention.
These conflicts between water law agendas in the human rights sphere can be
mitigated or reconciled by reinterpreting the human right to water and a
clean environment in several ways.
First, advocating and formulating human rights to water and a clean
environment, at both the national and international level, should tie such
rights more directly to the right to life.323 By so doing, these rights are
placed within the context where protection of human life (perhaps measured
by limiting loss of DALYs) is the primary goal of the right to water. Within
that context, policymakers and courts may be more likely to interpret such
human rights in terms that maximize human resilience to microbial diseases
and water-related epidemics. Such an interpretation should encourage variances from water quality standards and emergency waivers of permitting obligations to facilitate expeditious response to disease outbreaks, with such
exceptions to the norm seen as consistent with the promotion and protection
320 See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, supra note 31; McCaffrey, supra note 68, Neil A.F. Popovic, In
Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the Draft Declaration of Principles on
Human Rights and the Environment, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487 (1996).
321 Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2209; see also Daniel Bodansky,
Introduction: Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 511, 514 (2010); Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2209–13.
322 See, e.g., Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2205 n.127; see also Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 33 (2011).
323 Such a relationship between a human right to water and the right to life has been
made in some instances, including in General Comment 15 to the UN Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which stated that the right to water is a “prerequisite
for the realization of other human rights” and “falls within the category of guarantees
essential for securing an adequate standard of living.” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm.
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No.
15, The Right to Water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).
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of human rights. When rights to water and a clean environment conflict with
the right to life, such rights should be interpreted in favor of measures that
minimize the loss of DALYs.
Second, the human right to water and a clean environment should consistently be tied to a human right to sanitation.324 Fecal contamination of
drinking water sources is one of the primary causes of waterborne infections,
including cholera and Cryptosporidium.325 Despite the importance of sanitation, progress in that area lags far behind improvements in access to water
for drinking and domestic purposes. The UN’s Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) aimed to halve, by 2015, the proportion of the world’s population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.326
Nevertheless, progress in the sanitation sector has lagged far behind progress
in drinking water since the MDGs were announced.327 There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon. It could possibly be because NGOs,
development banks, and nations can more easily and attractively publicize
progress in drinking water than sanitation (glossy photographs of clean tap
water, wells, and water treatment plants tend to be more aesthetically pleasing as marketing and propaganda tools than photos of latrines). But part of
the explanation may be a simple preference for investment in drinking water
rather than sanitation, because sanitation is something people are less comfortable talking about than drinking water. Greater emphasis on sanitation
within the human rights conversation, and interpretation of the right to
water as including a right to sanitation, would facilitate this essential public
conversation.
Third, a human rights approach to water provision and quality should
be interpreted to include certain procedural rights associated with the development of water policy. A human right to water can be viewed as compromising two rights—a provision right and a participation right.328 A provision
right imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to sustainably provide
water of adequate quantity and quality.329 Such a provision right is problem324 The connection between water and sanitation in the human rights context had
been made elsewhere. See, e.g., 2010 U.N. Resolution, supra note 68; Lori Beail-Farkas, The
Human Right to Water and Sanitation: Context, Contours, and Enforcement Prospects, 30 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 761 (2013); Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation:
From Political Commitments to Customary Rule?, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 136
(2012); Murthy, supra note 142.
325 See, e.g., Nicholas John Ashbolt, Microbial Contamination of Drinking Water and Disease
Outcomes in Developing Regions, 198 TOXICOLOGY 229, 233–35 (2004).
326 G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 19, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 18, 2000).
327 UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND & WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROGRESS ON DRINKING
WATER AND SANITATION: 2012 UPDATE 18–25 (2012), http://www.unicef.org/french/
media/files/JMPreport2012.pdf; David J. Bradley & Jamie K. Bartram, Domestic Water and
Sanitation as Water Security: Monitoring, Concepts and Strategy, 371 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL SOC’Y 1, 6 (2013). See generally Grey & Sadoff, supra note 241.
328 See, e.g., Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36 (discussing the distinction
between a provision right to water and a participation right to water).
329 Id. at 2243.
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atic because it is difficult to enforce and define, and can reduce cost recovery
and incentives for water conservation.330 The other right is a participation
right, which involves a right to participate in the development of water policy
and procedural rights associated with water disconnection or rate
increases.331
The recognition of “participation” or a procedural component of a
human right to water has an important connection with the integration of
the Red Agenda into environmental impact statements. In 2013, California
introduced and enacted its “Human Right to Water Bill.”332 That bill recognizes that “every human being has the right to safe, clean, affordable, and
accessible water.”333 The most significant component of the law requires
state agencies to consider the human right to water when “revising, adopting,
or establishing policies, regulations, and grant criteria.”334 Under this
approach, the human right to water imposes an obligation to factor water
into all government actions. To the extent the right to water is reinterpreted
to comprise all three agendas, then such a procedural or participation right
approach would require a transparent and participatory stakeholder process
in the development of water policy that includes addressing the issues
addressed in the Red Agenda. For developing countries, such procedural
rights are likely most critically needed and most easily implemented in the
internal processes of development banks.
Ultimately, a right can hardly be characterized as a “human right” if it is
not primarily concerned with protecting humans. A human right to water
and a clean environment is self-parody if it results in the state providing
affordable water in close proximity to the point of use, so as to meet WHO
drinking water standards, for a population dying of cholera and malaria.
Human rights involves prioritization of societal concerns, and should begin
by putting first things first—the protection of human life.335
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to highlight instances of conflict and suggests measures to avoid instances where the Green and Blue Agendas conflict with the
Red because water policymakers failed to adequately integrate the Red
Agenda. This Article does not attempt to catalog all the possible ways in
330 See id. at 2220–36.
331 See id. at 2237–40, 2260–66.
332 Skylar Marshall, California Declares a Human Right to Water, U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
(June 10, 2013), http://duwaterlawreview.com/ca-human-right-to-water/.
333 CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(a) (West 2016). See generally HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
BILL IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 69.
334 CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(b).
335 See Larson, The New Right in Water, supra note 36, at 2193; see also ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 124 (1969) (“First things come first:
there are situations, as a nineteenth-century Russian radical writer declared, in which boots
are superior to the works of Shakespeare; individual freedom is not everyone’s primary
need.”).
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which the Blue and Green Agendas might clash with the Red Agenda, nor
the potentially inconsistent aims of the Blue and Green Agendas. There are
other possible conflicts between each water law’s agendas, including between
the Green and Blue (the impacts on the environment from the construction
of large dams or desalination plants, for example). Additionally, agendas can
have internal conflicts (competing demands for water between agriculture,
industry, and hydroelectric production under the Blue Agenda, for
example).
Characterizing the aims of each agenda as equity, efficiency, and resiliency is helpful for purposes of distinguishing each agenda’s respective core
goals, but it is also an oversimplification. Furthermore, these three agendas
are not intended to be exhaustive or suggest that all aims of water law can be
fit into these categories. For example, flood prevention and mitigation
potentially require a separate agenda with similar potential conflicts and synergies with other agendas. Also, silo thinking and attenuated decisionmaking
are at best partial explanations of the reasons why water policy agendas sometimes conflict. Some conflicts are inevitable, and trade-offs between agendas
are sometimes necessary, with goals valued differently depending on the economic and environmental conditions of the given jurisdiction. Additional
research will reveal how integration of these agendas is, and should be, pursued differently in developed countries as compared to developing countries.
Sustainable, clean, affordable water for the environment and for all people in current and future generations—the ultimate aim of the Blue and
Green Agendas—will improve and protect human health. And improving
and protecting human health is the ultimate aim of the Red Agenda. Ultimately, the purpose of this Article is to introduce this colored agenda framework to facilitate dialogue regarding the improved integration of water policy
aims and stronger ties between the study of natural resource and environmental law and the discipline of epidemiology. Integration of the Red
Agenda in water resource law, policy, and planning will strengthen the law’s
protection of human life in the time of cholera.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL306.txt

1322

unknown

Seq: 52

notre dame law review

21-MAR-17

12:19

[vol. 92:3

